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ABSTRACT
A NONLINEAR DYNAMIC METHOD FOR SUPPORTING LARGE-SCALE
DECISION MAKING IN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONM ENTS
W ayne Woodhams
Old Dominion University
Director: Dr. Laurence D. Richards
This research developed a methodology for supporting decision making
by reducing uncertainty in decision environments which are too large, dynamic
and complex to be treated by traditional quantitative and simulation techniques.
These environments are complex because of the free choice associated with
human involvement, and the existence of a large number of interrelated factors
which influence the outcomes of the decision process. They are dynamic
because the ground rules affecting those interrelationships are constantly
changing. Uncertainty cannot be treated probabilistically, since identification of
a full set of outcomes and factors of influence is not possible.
The venue for the investigation was the infrastructure which supports
commercial space launch activities in the United States. The issue treated was
whether it would be advisable to make large capital investment in that
infrastructure.
The problem was approached using the principles of Chaos Theory and
Nonlinear Dynamics, in a manner similar to that used by Priesmeyer (1992).
The intent was to engender a more systemic view of the environment and
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approach analysis by examining marginal changes, over a period of ten years,
in factors which tend to influence the outcome. The objective was to develop
hypotheses which, when validated, will provide a new perspective for decision
makers from which to enhance the robustness of these kinds of decisions.
The methodology, which evolved over several years of preliminary
research, involved identification of sectors of the commercial space
infrastructure, isolation of the more important decision factors, identification and
solicitation of knowledgeable respondents from the various infrastructure
sectors, development of a computerized qualitative data gathering instrument,
and graphical analysis of data represented by phase plane diagrams. Although
there was little evidence of “classical” chaotic behavior in the data, the analysis
was able to isolate those nonlinear dynamic relationships between decision
factors which appeared most likely to provide information regarding system
behavior. One hypothesis was developed directly from that observation. A
second resulted from the development of an aggregate measure of the level of
uncertainty (and, consequently, investment risk) inherent in the decision
environment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement
Most large-scale decision making is done in a dynamic, highly complex
environment. For purposes of this research, “large-scale” decision making is
defined as that which:
•

involves commitment of large sums of money (on the order of
millions of dollars) and/or similarly valued assets;

•

is performed in an environment which extends beyond the
decision maker’s own organization and over which she or he
has little or no control; and

•

attempts to influence outcomes which take a significant amount
of time (perhaps decades) to fully manifest themselves.

The environment is characterized as “dynamic” because the forces and
relationships which affect the decision and its outcomes are constantly
changing. Being populated and influenced primarily by humans and their
interactions, it is also characterized by nonlinear relationships and a high degree
of uncertainty regarding the future. The number of factors is too great, and the
interactions too complex, to allow analysis and comprehension through any kind
of linear approach.

1
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Ashby (1956), in discussing the Law of Requisite Variety contends that, in
order to fully regulate a system, the regulator must have at least as much variety
as that system. In terms of decision making, that could be restated as, "In order
to make a decision which guarantees an optimal outcome, the decision maker
must have at least the variety presented by the environment in which the
decision is to be made." Since this is obviously not possible, in order to make
some sensible decisions, ways must be found to reduce the variety in the
environment, increase the variety of the decision maker or, preferably, both.
Eoyang (1978) discusses these issues in terms of organizations coping
with unpredictable environments. He notes that organizations tend to try to
increase their variety to match that of the environment by organizing with greater
structural differentiation, more elaborate integration and more decentralized
conflict management. He goes on to say that organizations try to reduce the
variety in the environment by exercising some control over it through proactive
interaction (forming cartels, selection of board members, developing long-term
supply contracts, etc.). He suggests that a third method of reducing variety in
the environment is consistent with Ashby's work, that is, to reduce the variety of
potential outcomes of actions by adjusting goals.
But what can be said about the decision maker who needs to decide
whether or not to commit substantial amounts of resources in a market whose
complex, nonlinear and dynamic characteristics create the kind of uncertainty in
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3
which probabilistic methods of analysis do not apply, because, at a given
decision point, there exists neither a closed set of known potential outcomes, nor
a quantifiable set of variables and relationships? This kind of uncertainty has
been termed “primary uncertainty.”
Some ways of dealing with the variety of the decision maker, including
“robust" decision making (Gupta and Rosenhead, 1968, and Rosenhead, Elton
and Gupta, 1972) have been addressed. Adjustment of goals and objectives
through “satisficing” techniques has also been addressed (March and Simon,
1958). An area that remains for investigation is how to reduce (or at least find a
way of coping with) the variety imposed on the decision maker by the
environment.

Venue of Investigation
The chosen setting for the research has current relevance in the
technological business community. Over the past four decades, exploration and
exploitation of space has become a significant contributor to humankind’s
scientific and technological knowledge. Only recently, by comparison, has some
of the commercial potential of space been exploited. Thus far, the only
spaceborne commodity which has proven commercially viable is information and
communication. The reason is that the cost of access to space is still prohibitive
for most other kinds of activities. The question, then, which provides the venue
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for this research is: “Should an investment be made to develop the
infrastructure to support commercial space launch activities?” It is easily seen
that there are various technological, political, market, financial and other factors
which will influence the viability of such ventures. Middleton (1995) contends
that the track record of space launch market predictions is not very good, and
that it would be prudent for investors to seek advice from a wide range of
sources regarding assessment of factors capable of influencing market growth.
Most of these factors, however, are not directly measurable: they interact in
complex, nonlinear ways, and they are not predictable over the timeframe
required to establish the vehicles and infrastructure to provide cost effective
space access.

Purpose of the Research
The purpose of the research is to add to the body of knowledge and
supporting tools for strategic decision making, policy formulation and forecasting
in the kinds of environments characterized herein. Toward this purpose, the
investigation will employ qualitative data gathering methods and an analysis
based on the principles of nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory to investigate
the complex macroscopic relationships between factors which affect the viability
of investments in commercial space infrastructure.
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The research is investigative in nature, and not intended to stand as proof
of a given hypothesis. It is an examination of the data of a sample study, with
the intent of generating hypotheses regarding the utility of the methodology to
provide meaningful information to decision makers.
The methodology and hypotheses are generalizable to a broad range of
decision environments which embody the complexity and dynamic
interrelationships characteristic of the environment examined herein. One such
scenario might be the strategic decision by an automobile manufacturer
regarding development of an “alternatively powered" vehicle. It contains many
of the same kind of uncertain elements: emerging (and currently unknown)
technologies, dependence on government regulation, influence of public opinion,
level of competition and others.
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CHAPTER 2
UNDERLYING TH EO R Y OF RESEARCH (LITERATURE REVIEW )

The objective of this research is to examine a new methodology for
supporting large-scale strategic decision making in environments characterized
by nonlinear relationships of variables and primary uncertainty. Primary
uncertainty, which will be discussed in greater detail subsequently, can be
operationally defined as that situation in which probabilistic methods of analysis
do not apply because, at a given decision point, there exists neither a closed
set of known potential outcomes, nor a quantifiable set of interactions and
relationships between variables. As stated by Mendell (1985), all systems of
interest are open systems, susceptible to invasion by outside forces which
cannot be identified until they affect the system. Those forces are the “unkunks” (unknown unknowns).
The underlying theory comes from three domains. First, of course, is the
theory that supports strategic decision making itself, and particularly that which
deals with non-probabilistic decisions. Secondly, since strategic decision
making involves some attempt at adapting to an uncertain future, there is also an
element of (long-range) forecasting, with its associated grounding theory.

6
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Thirdly, this research attempts to deal with the complex, dynamic, nonlinear
relationships by applying analytical techniques derived from chaos theory. The
theoretical perspective of the research emerges from these domains as shown in
Figure 2-1.

Strategic Decision Theory and Policy Formulation
Thompson and Strickland (1981) define organizational strategy and policy as
activities associated with giving the organization purposeful direction toward
stated goals and objectives, and allocating resources toward that end. As
described in Chapter 1, the venue of this research involves a strategic decision
regarding allocation of resources to develop space launch infrastructure, as
opposed to some other venture. This specific scenario is clearly a subset of the
general definition given by Thompson and Strickland. Entities interested in the
outcome of the research would include commercial companies seeking
increased profits and/or market share, and government agencies seeking to
stimulate economic development.
It can be said that all decisions of any consequence made by
organizations involve some degree of uncertainty regarding the future.
Uncertainty, however, has always posed a problem for decision makers. Gul
and Lantto (1990) have stated:
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. . . . it is unlikely that any theory of choice under uncertainty which
is consistent with what an economist might consider rational
behavior will be capable of accommodating all observed behavior
in actual choice situations, nor is it clear that a purely descriptive
theory...will add substantially to our understanding of choice under
uncertainty. (Gul and Lantto 1990, 173)
Aiginger (1987) does not treat “uncertainty proper” (i.e., no probability function
can be formed regarding the variable of interest). He differentiates between risk
and uncertainty proper, the former being where probabilities can be estimated.
He contends that:
As a consequence of uncertainty proper, agents regress to simple
rule of thumb or convention, they behave in a conservative way
reacting only to dramatic changes in the environment. (Aiginger
1987, 31)
The views of Gul, Lantto and Aiginger notwithstanding, the literature
describes many tactics for dealing with uncertainty, but all make assumptions
regarding the bounds of the uncertainty: that is, they either ignore what is
admittedly unknowable or lump unknowables in with known factors. The majority
of decision methodologies (Clemen (1991), Dyckman et al. (1969), Hill et al.
(1979), Newbold (1986), Radford (1981), Easton (1980), Jedamus and Frame
(1969), Holloway (1979) and many others) involve some kind of probability
model, whether it be subjective (Savage, 1954), Bayesian or based on statistical
probability distributions (Binomial, Poisson, Exponential, Normal, Beta, Bernoulli,
Geometric, Multinomial, and others).
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Much of decision theory in light of uncertainty has revolved around the
concept of Expected Utility (Stigler, 1950; Allais and Hagen, 1979; Machina,
1982; Fishburn, 1970,1982; Schniedler, 1989; and Prelecand Loewenstein,
1991). But this framework, as well, requires assignment of probabilities for
decision variables. Other theories, including prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) and regret theory (Loomes and Sudgen, 1982) also require
assignment of probabilities to variables or states of nature.

Kami (1985) also

describes decision making under uncertainty in terms of the basic notions of
states of nature, acts, and consequences; the states of nature being governed
by either objectively or subjectively determined probabilities.
Many of these same authors discuss expected value, risk profiles,
dominance criteria, sensitivity analysis and the maximin, maximax and rationality
rules for choosing (acting, in Kami’s terminology) among alternative strategies,
but these rely on a knowledge of (or at least a guess at) the full set of possible
states of nature, and/or estimation of probabilities for those states. To further
complicate the issue, research by Bolger and Wright (1993) suggests that the
validity of probability judgments made by “domain experts” to support decisions
of this kind is suspect.
Some recent research examines new ways to support decision making.
Mehrez et al. (1995) propose that a powerful approach for describing systems
that are concurrent, parallel, asynchronous, distributed and non-deterministic
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involves representation using Petri Nets, which serve as meta-models for
complex decision problems. Petri Nets can replace decision trees, with the
advantages of providing some computational utility and the ability to represent
situations under certainty and (probabilistic) uncertainty. Dagsvik (1994) has
developed a method for generating choice probabilities for consumer demand
(states of nature) based on the stochastic properties of the demand function and
“consumption bundle vectors” of attributes of the decision outcomes.
Some attempts have been made to address the uncertainty issue via
specialized computer software. Cohen (1985) developed an expert system shell
called SOLOMON which employs a system of endorsements to reinforce or
refute uncertain propositions. The results, however, are difficult to interpret and
the propositions difficult to rank. Henrion, Morgan, Nair and W iecha (1986)
developed a computer model called Demos which was intended to aid policy
analysts in handling uncertainty and risk. But a criterion of its design was that
uncertain values be represented as probability distributions.
There has been research and methodologies have been proposed to
support decision making without the use of probabilities. Kelsey (1993)
discusses a method which can be used under partial uncertainty by a decision
maker who does not have the luxury of waiting for complete information. He
derives an ordinal scaling scheme for ranking potential states of nature in terms
of their likelihood of occurrence. The decision maker then would choose the
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action with the best payoff assuming that the most likely state of nature will
occur.
Beenhakker (1975) suggested a form of sensitivity analysis that entailed
making some contingency assumptions (based on the assumption that you must
have some idea of what might happen) at the outset of strategic planning.
However, he makes no provision to do any sequential planning, relating all
contingencies back to time zero. Yager (1980) developed a “theory of
possibility” based on fuzzy set theory, which was used by Tonn (1 9 8 6 ,1 9 9 1 ) in
his research regarding environmental policy decisions. Tonn observed that
there were many instances in long range planning in which even subjective
probabilities could not be generated. His model involved development of a
“possibility function" which described all possible future worlds so that policy
analysts and planners could plan to eliminate those undesirable outcomes, and
let society chart a more desirable, but unspecified course. Similarly, Mason and
Wilson (1987) propose that a process they term “future mapping” be used to
develop desirable end states - possibilities, not forecasts - and “event streams”
that identify what must happen along the way for them to get there. Then as
each milepost (decision point) is reached, the organization will know what action
will lead them toward one of the desirable end states. These models are
developed in brainstorming meetings and use matrices as visual displays.
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Others, including Cohen and Jaffrey (1980) and Arrow and Hurwicz
(1972) have looked at decision making under what they term “complete
ignorance,” meaning that the decision maker has no knowledge of how the
states of nature might influence the outcomes of actions taken. Cohen and
Jaffrey establish a set of axioms which define decision criteria without ascribing
probabilities to events. The method does, however, rely on the definition of a
complete set of events and outcomes, and bases decisions on comparison
between “extremal values” of acts. Arrow and Hurwicz do not presuppose a
fixed set of states of nature, posing the problem as a choice of action from a
given set, when the consequences of such action are functions of an unknown
state of nature.
One element of the decision environment examined herein that none of
the previously cited authors address is its dynamic nature: the fact that it can
change during the decision process. Hey (1993) performed research in which a
dynamic simulation with live subjects proved that few were capable of making
optimal decisions in a dynamic environment with only three variables changing.
He concludes that much of the lack of predictability in real-life markets results
from sub-optimal decisions made by those who assume that the environment is
predictable. The literature failed to reveal any research into the use of chaos
theory and/or nonlinear dynamics principles to address decision making issues,
other than Priesmeyer’s work which is discussed below.
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Robust (Investment) Decision Theory
Wittrock (1979) describes planning at the policy level as follows:
(It) involves the systematic preparation of decisions that may have
long term consequences, and the aim of this activity is not the
specification of future commitments, but to guarantee that policy
makers will in the future have as wide a range of options open as
possible. (Wittrock 1979, 268)
In two papers, Gupta and Rosenhead (1968) and Rosenhead, Elton and
Gupta (1972) contend that uncertainty in strategic planning and investment
strategy is characterized by those situations “...in which it is impossible to
attribute probabilities to the possible outcomes of any decision” (1972, p. 416).
They treat a special class of problem in which unpredictable future events may
influence the outcomes of sequential investment decisions, using a plant
location problem with an unpredictable product demand as an illustration. They
introduce the concepts of robustness and stability as measures, at any given
decision point in the planning period, of flexibility of the strategic plan to provide
a “good” (not optimal) result in light of future uncertainty. They accomplish this
by employing the technique of satisficing (March and Simon, 1958), which keeps
in consideration all possible end states for which the expected results exceed a
specified minimum. An element that they incorporate is that of time - in a sense
other than determination of net present value or discounted utility (Prelec and
Loewenstein, 1991). The element of time brings into focus the possibility of an
environment which changes throughout the planning cycle. Over long planning
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periods, a stab at gauging the effect of a series of unpredictable future events at
the outset is almost always in error.
The Gupta and Rosenhead formulation provides a good basis to begin to
look at problems of this nature. There are, however, some significant
differences between the simple plant location/distribution problem used as an
example in both of their papers, and the complex issues involved in developing
space launch infrastructure. The major difference is that in the plant location
problem there is only one uncertain variable (demand) and its effects on the
system are straightforward and easily determined.

The decision is one

dimensional: whether or not to construct the next plant, and if so, where.
Uncertainty in the launch infrastructure problem manifests itself in many
variables which interact in ways which are anything but straightforward.
Another difference is that there is residual value in the system of production
plants at any time in the future, even if it should be decided not to implement any
further development. The system exhibits “stability.” For launch infrastructure
development, on the other hand, unforeseen events could conceivably render
partially completed capital assets (and those decisions made to create them)
valueless. The current state of the U.S. Space Station Freedom program
(Lawler, 1993) provides a vivid example of this situation. Even though little
hardware was produced, the changes in government policy regarding funding
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and mission relegated much of the investment in scrapped designs to be
considered as sunk costs, with little residual value.
These particular authors (Gupta, et al.) seem to have foregone any further
investigation along these lines. No further discussion is evident in any available
subsequent literature. Others (Friend and Jessop, 1977) have used the analysis
of robustness of “action sets” as a method of selecting immediate commitments
in the continuing process of suburban planning. Dixit and Pindyck (1995)
discuss these same issues, likening the capital investment decision to financial
call options, providing the decision maker the right, but not the obligation to
purchase an asset at some future time. They go on to say, as do the others, that
keeping one’s options open is the best hedge against uncertainty. These
writings have not, however, added anything of significance to the theory
supporting decision making of the nature investigated herein.

Forecasting
W henever a decision must be made, the consequences of which are
dependent on future events which cannot be responded to rapidly, it is implied
that some kind of forecasting must be done. It is obvious that forecasting is a
constituent element of the research performed herein. Allaire and Firsirotu
(1989) have said that, for organizations, predicting the future is essential but not
sufficient, because of the inherent uncertainty. Rather, organizations should
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attempt to proactively shape the future environment (a “power response") and
build adaptiveness into their structures.
There is a great deal of literature regarding various theories and
methodologies for forecasting, almost all of which, according to Armstrong
(1985), has been generated since 1960. The field can be narrowed somewhat
for this research because of the type of decision environment considered (longrange, large-scale investment decisions in complex, nonlinear environment with
primary uncertainty relating to the decision variables).
The difficulty in forecasting varies directly with the range of the forecast
and the number and unpredictability of the factors which influence the decision.
Armstrong (1985) defines long range as the length of time in which large
changes in the environment may occur. Wittrock (1979) contends that in
forecasting, “long range” implies that commitments and restrictions which apply
in the present will not necessarily apply over the forecast time span.
Relationships between the basic variables which determine current system
behavior may not remain the same. In environments similar to those under
examination herein, it is this inability to extrapolate the relationships among
variables over lengthy time periods, or even to quantify them in the present,
which has made forecasting a difficult and imprecise undertaking. Given that
this research deals with programs that could take up to twenty years to
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implement, and that in this amount of time significant environmental changes can
occur, treating the forecasting elements as “long range” is appropriate.
Wittrock goes on to say that in cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary long
range forecasting, which are also characteristic of the environment under
consideration, alternatives cannot be assigned numerical probabilities. Handling
of this kind of uncertainty by planning and policy making organized by industrial
sector will not encounter a great degree of success. Armstrong and Raiffa
(1968) contend that when there is a high degree of uncertainty and aggregation
required for prediction, the ability to forecast is enhanced by decomposing the
issue into more manageable subsets.
Armstrong believes that an "eclectic” approach (use of several
instruments and techniques to approach the problem from different perspectives)
is best when dealing with high uncertainty and “fuzzy” parameters which defy
measurement. He presents a taxonomy of forecasting methodologies which is
shown here as Figure 2-2.
Of interest here is the differentiation between the “naive” and “causal"
methodologies of forecasting. Naive methods simply trace the changes, over
time, in the variable to be forecast. Causal methods, on the other hand,
investigate the causal relationships between the forecast variable and other
variables/factors which influence it in some fashion.
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Also of interest is the differentiation between “subjective” and “objective”
methodologies. The critical difference is that the objective methods rely more on
hard data and are, for the most part, experimentally repeatable, while the
subjective methods, although often supported by objective data, are cognitive
and heuristic in nature, usually varying between forecasters.
Perhaps the most popular of the subjective methodologies is scenario
building, in which alternative futures are generated under various assumptions
about intervening events. Armstrong does not recommend scenarios as a way
to improve forecast accuracy, but does see them as useful in helping people to
confront unpleasant forecasts. Others (Mendeli, 1985, Ascher and Overholt,
1983) see scenario building as the most useful non-extrapolative methodology.
Mendeli feels that the most useful outcome of this kind of exercise is that it
enriches the supply of ideas about the future.
Ascher and Overholt feel that whenever there is a richness of interaction,
contextual and scenario analyses are the methodologies of choice. If a strategy
is designed for each potential environment, then the policy maker can quickly
shift in response to changes in the environment. They also contend that there is
a “core environment” which is unlikely to change regardless of future events.
One scenario approach which Armstrong supports as a way to help
forecasters free themselves of constraints is to envision living in an “ideal”
future, and looking back to construct the series of events which transpired to
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make it so. Priesmeyer (1992) describes this as “visioning.” Ascher and
Overholt refer to it as “reverse scenario building.” Mendeli calls it “future
backward” scenario generation. The shortcoming of this approach, of course, is
that it assumes that the forecasting entity can, in some measure, influence all of
the environmental factors which determine its future.

Chaos Theory and Nonlinear Dynamics
Chaos Theory was popularized in the scientific community by Ilya
Prigogine (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984), James Gleick (1988) and others, and
to the general public by Michael Crichton (1990). One of the basic premises, as
discussed by Prigogine and Gleick, is that systems whose behavior appears to
be unpredictable or chaotic at one level of investigation may conform to certain
behavioral constraints when viewed from a different level. These constraints, or
“attractors,” confine the possible excursions of the system’s behavior to an
observable state space, and add an element of predictability to that behavior. It
is this element of Chaos Theory which is generic to the analysis and results of
the research described herein. Another important characteristic of chaotic
systems is their sensitivity to initial conditions: the state of the system at any
given time in the future can vary drastically with minute differences in the initial
values of parameters. While the system may be predictable over a short time
period, longer term predictability (of exactly which state the system will be in at a
given time) is not possible. Also noted by these researchers is that chaotic
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systems are not random. It would not be possible to extract any information from
a system which behaves randomly. The only predictability regarding its state at
a given time in the future would be that it could assume any of its possible states
(the number of which, in a complex system, is very large and probably unknown)
with equal probability.
Several researchers have used chaos and nonlinear dynamics
approaches as a framework for discussing and investigating economic and
organizational phenomena and practices. At a broad macroscopic level, Bullard
and Butler (1993) discuss the possibility that economic time series are
characterized by chaotic dynamics, and that linear frameworks of analysis can
lead to erroneous policy inferences.

Nonlinear dynamics gives economists a

way to look at systems in which the steady state is unstable, but constrained in
some way to a periodicity, or at least bounded by some attractor. They conclude
that strange attractors, although difficult to identify without large sample sizes,
might be exploited by economists in some situations. They report, however, that
the theory and methodologies of nonlinear dynamics had not, at the time of their
writing, caused any changes in economic policy development. The same
general conclusion was reached by Sayers (1991); that is, that nonlinear
structures are observable in financial and economic time series, but their
importance in modeling, forecasting and policy formulation is yet to be
determined.
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Smilor and Feeser (1991) have attempted to analyze the entrepreneurial
process of starting up a technology enterprise, using chaos theory as a
framework. Their contention is that the process is turbulent (chaotic) and highly
sensitive to the initial conditions in the availability and quality of talent,
technology, capital and know-how. Chaos theory, then, helps to explain the
nature of the risk involved in entrepreneurial ventures, and provides a framework
for further research.
Cartwright (1991) uses chaos theory as a framework to discuss planning
in unpredictable environments. The systems are considered chaotic because of
the element of free will, which renders planning based on prediction illogical.
The implication of this with respect to planning is that planners must work with
an “ensemble” of forecasts, since any imprecision in measurement of initial
(current) conditions, even if the parametric relationships of the predictive model
are accurate, will result in a broad range of potential “futures.” Planners must
learn to work with models that exhibit this kind of behavior, and not fear reliance
on simple models of complex behavior. He contends further that since chaotic
systems are relatively predictable on a short-term basis, it justifies planning
strategies that are incremental and adaptive, rather than comprehensive. Very
little empirical work has been accomplished, however, with respect to this
theoretical approach to planning.
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Relating to strategic development of organizations, Stacey (1993)
maintains that managers cannot mandate the long-term direction of their
organizations because the nonlinear dynamic feedback of human interactions is
unpredictable. Alternatively, what they should do is to create the unstable
conditions that allow organizations to redefine themselves in new strategic
directions. These strategies emerge spontaneously from chaos through real
time learning and self organizing. Decision making then becomes an exploratory
process based on reasoning and analogy rather than analysis of hard data.
Richards (1990) presents some empirical evidence that political strategic
decision making can exhibit chaotic behavior, but acknowledges that to identify
chaotic behavior in this arena requires representation of decision making in a
quantitative schema, and also requires a lengthy series of precise data, neither
of which is easily obtained. From her example of crisis decision making, she
concludes that while specific outcomes are impossible to predict, boundaries
can be established which surround the set of possible outcomes.
Priesmeyer (1992) and Priesmeyer and Baik (1989) discuss some
practical ways of examining complex organizational relationships using marginal
performance data and the analysis techniques generic to nonlinear dynamics
and chaos theory. The premise is that much of the complex behavior exhibited
by organizations emerges from deterministic processes, and that some of the
complexity can be stripped away by using those techniques and methods of
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observation. Two of the characteristics of chaotic systems mentioned earlier
(constraint imposed by attractors and sensitivity to initial conditions) are central
to this analysis methodology, which seeks to reduce the variety in the
environment by being able to understand what the system cannot do (or at least
is unlikely to do).
Priesmeyer discusses application of this methodology based on chaos
theory to forecasting and decision making in the business environment. He uses
readily accessible and measurable historical business data such as sales
volume and profit as the observed parameters. From this data, he creates
trajectories in phase planes, which define the domains of system behavior. Each
axis of a phase plane represents changes in one of the parameters over a unit of
time. Analysis of these trajectories provides information regarding repeatability
and/or domains of the dynamic relationships between the observed parameters.
In Priesmeyer’s framework, forecasting is discussed as “visioning,” which
is similar in purpose to scenario building. The forecaster traces the trajectory of
the selected performance parameters throughout recent history and “selects” a
desired and reasonably attainable future trajectory. Then the business,
assuming that it has some control over its environment, takes such actions
deemed necessary to enable the envisioned future.
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Departure From Existing Theory
Chaos theory and nonlinear dynamics approaches to forecasting and
decision making, as presented by Priesmeyer, have been based on analysis of
two variable systems using quantitative data from individual organizations. The
decision environment to be examined herein is not well bounded (like an
organization) and has many factors which all interact dynamically in ways which
are impossible to fully understand and predict. Further, due to the size and
complexity of the decision environment, identification of the complete set of
factors capable of affecting the decision environment is difficult, if not
impossible. The factors are largely qualitative in nature, with little statistical data
available. W hat sets this research apart from prior applications of chaos theory
and nonlinear dynamics to forecasting and decision making problems, then, is
that it will deal with multivariate systems, using qualitative data as input.
In terms of Armstrong’s taxonomy of forecasting methodologies (Figure
2-2), the methodology developed herein is a new approach in which the process
is largely objective, but has a distinct judgmental element. The method is
primarily causal in that it bases its predictive power on the dynamic relationships
between variables. It does not fit in either the linear or classification model, but
stands on its own. A modified Figure 2-2 appears as Figure 2-3.
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CHAPTER 3
M ETHODOLO GY

Background
Data which supports this research was collected over a period of three
years. For the first two of those years, data was obtained via literature review
and informal contact with people functioning in the selected “environment” (the
business of accessing space). This process served to define that environment
in terms of its key participant groups and factors that affect the decision process
investigated herein. This information was used as a basis for developing the
formal data gathering instrument and identifying potential respondents. The
reliability and validity of these data are established mainly through the
multiplicity of sources from which they were obtained, and the general
consensus on those data elements to be identified in subsequent paragraphs,
which were used in the investigation.
The Center for Commercial Space Infrastructure (CCSI) was established
within the Department of Engineering Management at Old Dominion University in
March of 1992. Its stated objective was to foster, through research,
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development and education, the growth of those technological systems and
organizational entities required for commercial space activities. As Assistant
Director of CCSI, the thrust of the researcher’s activities for the first two years
involved definition of the organizational elements of the infrastructure which
supports access to space, and gaining entry into those organizations to develop
funded research opportunities. Bootstrapping this operation involved content
analysis of publications and documents, and personal contact by phone and/or
mail with functionaries in industry, government and academia. Appendix A
contains a partial listing of the literature reviewed and contacts established as
a part of this effort.
Subsequent to that period of bootstrapping, the efforts of the Center were
concentrated on establishing the physical assets and management interfaces
required to support viable commercial space launch operations at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Wallops Flight Facility at Wallops
Island, Virginia. These activities provided the background, much of the specific
data and the personal contacts necessary to accomplish this research. The
industry and government policy makers involved have been grappling with the
kind of decision that is being investigated herein.
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Theoretical/Conceptual Framework of the Research
The primary purpose of this research is to introduce and investigate an
alternative way of viewing and developing planning strategies in an environment
of economic, technological and political uncertainty. It is intended to contribute
to knowledge and theory in the area of sociotechnical decision making and
policy formulation in any endeavor that involves commitment of resources, over
long periods, in unpredictable environments.
Due to the nature of the problem, the research will embody the
methodology of Qualitative Inquiry (Patton, 1990). There are several aspects of
the research which support this approach. It is basically a process study,
seeking to understand and improve the processes of planning and decision
making. It involves futuring applications - forecasting and construction of
scenarios as predictive tools. It is, to a great extent, exploratory in nature, and
the literature review failed to identify any acceptable, valid, reliable quantitative
measures or methods that could address the issues at hand. The data required
are of a highly subjective nature and not readily quantifiable. While ordinal
scaling is performed and the data are mathematically manipulated, the
numbers generated are symbolic and merely facilitate the acquisition and
presentation of data, rather than their analysis or implementation. The primary
data gathering instrument elicits qualitative responses to specific issues, for
most of which there exists no hard data.
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The research is characterized as Exploratory Applied Research. It is
Applied Research, since it seeks to "inform action, enhance decision making,
and apply knowledge to solve human and societal problems" (Patton, 1990, p.
12). Applied research takes the findings of basic research and applies them to
real-world problems, which is exactly the intent of this research. It is exploratory
because it seeks to generate hypotheses regarding the predictability of
behavior of highly complex sociotechnical systems in uncertain environments,
and identify the direction(s) in which continued research might proceed. The
environment under consideration is characterized by emerging technology and
(relatively) rapid changes in the economic and political environment. The
techniques investigated herein are intended to support decisions and policy
formulation, the ramifications of which will not be fully realized for several years.
There is, therefore, no practical way to “test” the validity of these measures by
monitoring results.
The theoretical perspective of the research is grounded in systems
theory, which seeks to determine why a system as a whole behaves as it does,
and in the nonlinear dynamics elements of chaos theory. In order to attempt to
reconcile some of the uncertainty in the decision process, the policy maker and
the environment in which the resultant policy decisions play out must be
considered as a system with highly complex and nonlinear interactions.
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Identification of Sectors of the Environment
In order to investigate the dynamic relationships in a system, it is first
necessary to define the boundaries of that system. The system has been
defined so far as including the decision/policy maker and the “environment” in
which the decisions must play out. Identification of the components, or sectors,
of that environment is necessary not only to bound the system under
consideration, but also to provide a framework for selection of potential
respondents for data collection.
The system has previously been described in another way: as the
infrastructure which supports commercial space launches. The documentation
and personal contacts listed in Appendix A provided the data used to develop
Figure 3-1. Each major branch of the diagram is operationally defined as a
sector of the environment for this research. In a more general sense, a sector of
the environment is operationally defined as a group of people or organizations
representing a specific discipline, industry component or public agency type
which, by some current or future action (or lack thereof) of its constituents, can
influence the outcome of strategic decisions. The sectors identified for this
research are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
NASA performs or directly funds a large portion of the research and
development regarding space transportation. They also are responsible for
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developing many scientific satellites and payloads. But most importantly, NASA
is a key player in the “business” of space access.
Agencies of the federal government constitute a significant portion of the
infrastructure which supports commercial space access. The Department of
Defense (DoD) is the other key player, from the public sector, in the business of
space access. DoD (particularly the Air Force) is responsible for conducting
much of the launch activity in the U.S., as well as sponsoring a large portion of
the research and development. Federal agencies are also largely responsible
for setting the tone of the regulatory environment, which can be looked at as
either facilitating or constraining space access. The Department of
Transportation is responsible for granting licenses and defining insurance
guidelines for commercial launch vehicles and activities. Other agencies
sponsor basic research and are involved in payload development. And
Congress, of course, is responsible for legislation which affects the conduct of
space business.
State agencies are becoming involved, to an increasing extent, in the
business of space flight. All of the states shown in Figure 3-1 have pursued
some plans to provide a launch facility.

Alaska, California, New Mexico, Florida

and Virginia all currently have state-sponsored “spaceport” activities which
currently, or will in the near future, have launch capability.
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The commercial space industry, of course, is the provider of the majority
of space hardware and support services (whether privately funded or under
government contract). Industry is also the driving force behind commercial
space, in that it determines the need, markets the customers and designs the
systems that satisfy that need. Because industry is profit motivated, it also
provides the impetus for cost accountability and effectiveness in space
operations.
Insurance providers play a significant role in determining the cost of
space access. Satellites and payloads are routinely insured against loss or
damage before, during and subsequent to launching. Third party liability
insurance against possible loss as a result of the act of launching vehicles is
also required.
The legal aspects of the space business are complex and, in many areas,
still being defined. Space law is becoming a specialty among legal practitioners.
Legal interpretation of various aspects of space enterprise, in addition to being
a cost element for providers, has an effect on the laws which define the business
environment.
The academic community provides basic and applied research which
contributes to the body of knowledge in all of the technology and operations
domains. Many academic institutions, either individually or cooperatively,
through consortia and associations, develop scientific experiment payloads and
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satellites. Perhaps most importantly, academia produces the scientists,
engineers, technicians, managers and business people who populate the space
infrastructure.
One of the more serious problems for space business ventures is
securing the large amounts of capital necessary to underwrite spaceborne
system and launch vehicle development programs.

The return on investment

usually takes many years to materialize, and is (as this investigation tends to
support) risky. This kind of environment makes the financial industry, and the
financial decision makers in major corporations, an important sector of the
infrastructure.
Space-related organizations provide important forums for communications
regarding business and technology issues.

Some have powerful lobbyists

which can influence high level policy. Others organize efforts of industry,
government and academia in pursuit of joint space ventures.
International entities play an important role in the infrastructure, mainly by
way of providing competition to U.S. systems and service providers. In the
launch services segment of the industry, the competition is especially fierce, due
to heavy foreign government subsidization of launch vehicle providers.
International organizations also control the availability of the radio frequency
spectrum available to proposed communications systems.
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The media plays an important role in disseminating technological and
business information, and also influences public perception and awareness of
space issues. The public at large can hold sway over legislative and business
policy via their votes for public office, proxy votes as stockholders in
corporations and pressure exerted by special interest groups.

Identification of Factors Affecting Decision Making
The question which provides the arena for the research is whether it is
advisable to invest in development of the physical and organizational
infrastructure to support commercial access to space. From a business
standpoint, the problem would be approached in terms of return on investment,
which is dependent on the size of the initial outlay and the amounts and timing of
subsequent cash flows. The uncertainty in the environment for the potential
investor (that which this research seeks to reduce) manifests itself in terms of
those future cash flows.
In order for the research to proceed, then, it was necessary to isolate and
operationally define the factors which exert influence over the investment
decision (i.e., the potential future cash flows). In general, a decision factor is
operationally defined as a discernible policy or activity of any person, group,
organization or sector in the environment that has an influence on the outcome
of strategic decisions.
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For purposes of this study, the ten most relevant factors which emerged
from the informal data gathering period were selected. Given the complexity of
the environment, it is conceded that there exist several other environmental
factors that can be of influence, but considering the exploratory nature of this
investigation and its stated objective, investigation of additional, less influential
factors is expected to yield diminished returns. By definition, in an environment
characterized by “primary” uncertainty, the full set of these factors cannot be
defined. Therefore, to require that all factors be identified would defeat the
purpose of the methodology.
Even with consideration limited to ten factors, there is substantial richness
and depth to the problem. Attempts at construction of an influence diagram
(Clemen, 1991) for the factor set were futile: the number of potential influences
were more numerous than the permutations of the factors.
Since the data gathered for analysis related directly to the set of factors, it
was necessary to operationally define each of them. The following paragraphs
provide those definitions and brief discussion of some of the more readily
apparent influences.
Arguably the most influential of the factors considered is the market for
space launches, which when viewed historically is the level of launch activity.
For this study, the market is defined as the number of payloads, in the range of
five hundred to eight thousand pounds that have been manifested for launch into
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low earth orbit. Its relevance to the decision is that the strength of the market
(the number of payloads) directly affects the investment risk.
The launch cost, per pound of mass, of placing a payload into low earth
orbit using expendable launch vehicles affects the profitability of the payload
developers, the ultimate customers for launch services. Reducing the cost of
orbital access lowers the threshold of acceptance for payload project budgets,
thereby creating a larger market.
The legal and regulatory environment affects the costs and availability of
launch services. Environmental laws in the United States effectively limit the
number of land-based launch sites to those that currently exist, and also place
some constraint on the types of launch vehicles that can be used. Licensing of
commercial launches requires conformance to regulatory mandates such as the
level of third party liability insurance coverage required, range safety, personnel
safety and interference with on-going air and sea transportation activities. This
factor is defined in terms of the extent to which the administration is supportive
of commercial space activities.
The support of the current federal administration and its policy regarding
commercial space has a distinct effect on the way in which commercial entities
interact with federal agencies. Aside from NASA, which is treated separately,
agencies such as the Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce
and the Environmental Protection Agency play important roles in the facilitation
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of commercial space access. The administration is also influential in
establishing national policy in many areas which affect the ability of space
enterprises to compete, both domestically and internationally. This factor is
defined in terms of the extent to which the administration is supportive of
commercial space activities.
The amount of competition, defined as the number of competing entities
offering launch services in the payload range of interest is a determining factor
of market share and profitability.

Competition from foreign providers who are

substantially underwritten by their governments, is particularly challenging for
U.S. launch companies.
The introduction of new technology affects both the cost of space access
and the potential for exploiting the environment of space for commercial and
scientific endeavors. Technology, in effect, provides the “reason to go” into
space, as well as the means to get there. In terms of this investigation, the most
predominant of these technologies are communications, launch vehicle design,
propulsion, remote sensing, materials processing and life sciences. This factor
is operationally defined as the aggregate rate of new technology introduction,
without segregating it into specific technologies.
Public opinion regarding space exploration influences Congress in its
legislative actions (especially concerning budgets), influences corporate
decisions via stockholder influence, and influences the number and quality of
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people who are interested in pursuing education and careers in space related
occupations. Special interest groups can also influence government actions at
the grass roots level. This factor is defined in terms of the extent to which public
opinion is supportive of space activities.
The amount of applied academic research performed on space related
issues and problems directly affects the rate of new technology development
and application. It also affects the number and quality of potential workers in the
industry, particularly if performed at academic institutions. This factor is defined
in terms of the level of space-related academic research.
At the time of this writing, three of the four operational space launch
facilities in the U.S. are owned by the Department of Defense (Cape Canaveral
and Vandenberg by the Air Force and W hite Sands by the Army). The support
of DoD , and its policy toward private sector activities, therefore, has a marked
effect on the viability of commercial space activities, due to its influence on cost
and scheduling of launch activities. This factor is defined in terms of the extent
to which DoD is supportive of commercial space activities.
The fourth operational launch facility is owned by NASA. The effects on
commercial space operations, then, are the same as those of DoD. The support
of NASA, and its policy regarding technology transfer and cooperation with
commercial enterprises also has a direct effect on the viability of commercial
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activities. This factor is defined in terms of the extent to which NASA is
supportive of commercial space activities.
The preceding discussion highlights a few of the major interactions that
are assumed to exist between the factors. There are certainly many more subtle
but still potent interactions that exist. It is easy to see how difficult it would be to
identify the individual effects of all the potential interactions, even if they were
linear and static. Since they are nonlinear and dynamic, direct analysis and
prediction by mathematical or traditional simulation techniques becomes
impossible. This gives some insight into the nature and magnitude of the
uncertainty in the decision environment.
As stated earlier, there is no way to identify all of the factors which might
influence the decision. For the methodology to be useful in a practical situation,
however, it is important that as many of the major influences as possible be
identified and included in the analysis. This brings up an important issue
regarding the generalizability of this methodology to other decision systems. In
this research, the researcher was also a domain expert, and this expertise
(based on knowledge of the environment gleaned from experience and literature
content analysis in the informal data gathering phase) enabled “direct”
identification of the environmental sectors and decision factors. It cannot be
assumed that a researcher in another decision system would have the requisite
expertise to perform that dual role.
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To generalize the methodology, identification of the infrastructure sectors
and decision factors must be undertaken as part of the formal data gathering
process. The additional procedural steps required will be discussed
subsequently in this chapter, in the section entitled “Selection and Recruitment
of Survey Respondents.”

Formal Data Gathering

Human Subjects
In this research, human subjects were used as sources of data. The
sections to follow discuss the survey instrument and the process of selecting and
recruiting respondents.
Participation by respondents was on a strictly voluntary basis, and the
survey instrument was completed at their leisure. Potential respondents were
contacted by phone and briefed regarding the process prior to agreeing to
participate. There was no organizational participation: only individuals were
solicited. No one from the researcher’s organization was solicited for data
gathering. There was, therefore, no pressure from within an organization to
participate, and no consequence of not participating. Anonymity of respondents
was guaranteed, and maintained throughout the process. In this document, they
are referred to by coded numbers, and any references to themselves in the data
were stricken.
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This process was designed with two objectives in mind: the first being to
avoid, as much as possible, exposing the respondents to any potential hardship,
and the second was to reduce the possibility of any bias being introduced by the
relationship between the researcher and respondents. All data were collected in
the absence of real-time contact between researcher and respondent.
Human subjects were also used, subsequently, to support the analysis of
data. In this instance, the subjects were chosen at random from the researcher’s
organization. The objective was to preclude researcher bias in the interpretation
of data, and the only requirement for participation was that the subject be
unfamiliar with the factors being analyzed. Again, participation was strictly
voluntary and anonymous. The relationship between the researcher and
subjects was collegial: none reported to the researcher organizationally. The
task was simple, involved little time, and was done at their leisure and not in the
presence of the researcher.

The Survey Instrument
One of the aspects which makes decisions difficult in environments of
primary uncertainty and nonlinear dynamics is that relevant and meaningful
quantitative data which directly measures the “amounts" of the factors is not
readily obtainable. Such is the case for the decision environment under
investigation. Of the ten factors identified above, only market, cost and
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competition lend themselves to any kind of direct measurement. A method was
required to collect qualitative data that embodies the kind of information desired:
relative levels of factors from one period of observation to the next. The
resulting qualitative instrument was employed for all factors, including those for
which quantitative data may exist.
W hen dealing with very large decision scenarios, the level of people
involved tends to be rather high. The target respondent sample population
included people with oversight responsibilities (program managers, department
heads, high level staffers, etc.). Given the constraints on their time, and perhaps
lower level of technical sophistication, the instrument needed to provide an
interface that would be readily understandable and somewhat familiar, facilitate
the desired data format, and be doable in a reasonable amount of time or in
multiple, short sessions. Because of the geographic dispersion of the desired
sample group, face-to-face contact for data gathering was not feasible.
Given those requirements and constraints, the survey instrument was
designed so that it could be self-administered and would operate in a familiar
environment - a personal computer using Microsoft Windows™. To facilitate the
gathering of data which highlights changes in levels or amounts of the factors
from respondents who would not be expected to have hard data, an input
scheme was devised, using the graphics user interface of the computer. Data is
entered using the computer’s mouse to create a set of bar graphs which illustrate
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the respondent's knowledge of the historical behavior of factors related to the
decision at hand.
Each of the ten factors discussed above is the subject of a bar graph and
has a dedicated data entry screen and data area in the software. The question
posed for each factor requires the respondent to relate his or her knowledge of
how the factor has changed over the past decade. The question set is
reproduced here as Table 3-1. Each bar of a graph corresponds to the relative
“amount” of the factor under consideration, on a ratio measurement scale
(Kerlinger, 1986) of zero to ten, for a given year. The independent variable of
the graph (time) is divided into ten years, ranging from 1985 through 1994.

TABLE 3-1
SURVEY QUESTION SET
Question 1
Question 2
Question 3
Question 4
Question 5
Question 6
Question 7
Question 8
Question 9
Question 10

W hat has been the relative level of small to mid-sized (500 to 8,000 lbs. to LEO)
launch activity over the past 10 years?
How has the cost per pound of payload mass to LEO, for Expendable Launch
Vehicles, varied over the past 10 years?
How strongly has the legal/regulatory environment supported commercial space
activities over the past 10 years?
How strongly has the federal administration supported commercial space
activities over the past 10 years?
What has been the relative level of competition (how many small to mid-sized
launch providers, world-wide) over the past 10 years?
What has been the relative level of new technology introduction for small to mid
sized ELV's and satellites over the past 10 years?
How supportive of space activities has the public been over the past 10 years?
What has been the relative level of space-related academic research activity
over the past 10 years?
How has NASA's support of commercial space varied over the past 10 years?
How has DoD's support of commercial space varied over the past 10 years?
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To anchor the data in time, and to support its validity, respondents are
requested to identify, where possible, specific events which are reflected in
significant features of the graphs (maxima, minima, points of inflection). The
reliability of the data, in terms of repeatability, is not considered important here.
Repeatability in terms of the same respondent duplicating data levels at each
interval on successive test runs is not important because it is the relative
changes and trends in the data which are being observed, rather than the
absolute levels. Inter-respondent repeatability of incremental data was not
anticipated and not required, since analysis was based on aggregation of these
data into average responses.

Reliability in terms of accuracy is not measurable

for most of the factors, since the data are qualitative and there is no standard
against which to measure. Respondents were, however, free to use, and
specifically asked to identify, the sources of any quantitative data used in their
responses.
To further support the data validity, there are opportunities associated
with every data entry screen for respondents to provide additional information
and comments, in text format. There is also a final summary comments screen
to provide space for general comments regarding the survey topics or the
instrument itself.
To provide the easiest path of data input and retrieval, the instrument was
developed in Microsoft Visual Basic™ and is linked to a Microsoft Access™ data
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base. The software was compiled to an executable code that installs and runs
under Microsoft Windows™ and is distributed on floppy diskettes. Respondents
were required to run the software program and return the diskettes to the
researcher when finished. Appendix B provides a complete set of the software
“screens” as they appear to the respondent, and a copy of the instructions for
use which accompanied each diskette.

Selection and Recruitment of Survey Respondents
The objectives of this phase of the study were twofold. The first was to
ensure that there was a sufficient number of responses to each question to yield
a data sample size sufficient to apply some statistical techniques to evaluate the
data, and to provide some confidence in using the average response as data for
the analysis. The target, given the limitations of resources available and the
expected inability of respondents to address all of the ten questions posed, was
to obtain a minimum of five responses to each question.
The qualifications for respondents required that they be rather intimately
involved, in a decision making position, in their specific infrastructure sector.
They would also possess experience and/or knowledge of the environment that
extends over the past decade. This kind of respondent demographic ruled out a
random sampling scheme. A purposeful sampling scheme (Patton, 1990) was
implemented to achieve the objective.
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The second objective was to maximize the breadth of responses over the
various sectors of the infrastructure. A maximum variation sampling scheme
(Patton, 1990) was adopted. While this sampling scheme is more likely to
induce apparent randomness in the responses, it serves to highlight those
particularly significant patterns which emerge from a diverse respondent group.
The target was to have at least one respondent from each of the infrastructure
sectors (with the exception of the general public and international entities).
In order to ensure that the minimum of five responses would be obtained
for each question, a total of twenty potential respondents were solicited. To
maximize the potential number of qualified responses per respondent, a
selection process was devised using the principles of Quality Function
Deployment (QFD) as described by Bossert (1991). QFD is a quality tool that
establishes the framework for articulating exactly what an organization needs to
do to respond to customer requirements. The mechanism is a set of correlation
matrices which, at the lowest level, relate the “whats" (customer requirements) to
the “hows” (organizational responses). The magnitudes of the correlations,
expressed numerically in the matrix cells, indicate the leverage of the
organizational responses in satisfying customer requirements.
The correlation matrix shown in Figure 3-2 was developed, relating the
infrastructure sectors to the decision factors. The correlations indicated in the
matrix cells were developed by the researcher, based on information obtained
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during the informal data gathering phase, and represent the expected ability of a
person in a particular sector to be knowledgeable regarding the associated
factor. The number of respondents to be solicited from each sector was
determined by multiplying the weighted average of the correlation scores for
each sector (row in the matrix) by the desired number of respondents (twenty).
In order to further encourage diversity of respondent viewpoints,
whenever more than one respondent was to be solicited from a sector, they
would be selected, where possible, from different subgroups as shown on Figure
3-1. Once the sector subgroups were identified, contact was established via
telephone with individuals meeting the experience/knowledge criteria. Those
who agreed to participate were provided with the survey instrument. A listing of
the positions held by the solicited respondents is provided as Appendix C.
Returning to the issue of generalizing the data gathering process to
situations in which the researcher is not also a domain expert, it is evident that
some modification to the above methodology would be required. In the case of a
“naive” researcher, a two-stage survey of respondents would be necessitated to
ensure that all relevant factors and sectors are addressed in the survey process.
It is reasonable to assume that in an organization making strategic
decisions of the type addressed, there will be individuals who can formulate a
“basic set” of decision factors and environmental sectors, and also identify
potential respondents within those sectors. To develop a full spectrum of factors
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and sectors from this basic set, QFD techniques would again be used. In this
case, a matrix with partially completed axes (containing only the basic set of
factors and sectors) would be distributed to the limited set of respondents, who
would then be asked to complete the matrix and establish the correlations. From
the responses, a comprehensive set of factors, and a complete list of sectors
from which to draw additional respondent candidates could be generated.
Correlation figures would establish the levels of sector representation in the
candidate mix, as before.

Data Analysis

Data Processing
The survey software automatically converts the qualitative graphic inputs
to numeric variables on the zero to ten ratio scale, and stores the values in a
Microsoft Access™ data base file on the survey diskette upon completion of
program execution. Data from returned survey responses were compiled in a
Microsoft Excel™ spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was used to calculate and plot
all parameters and statistics used in the analysis. Quantitative data and
comments were also transferred to a Microsoft Word™ file and presented as
Appendix D.
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Development of Marginal Change Data
The primary characteristic of the data which is examined in this analysis is
the relationship of marginal changes, over successive years, between two or
more of the environmental “factors” which influence the decision. The analysis
evolved through two approaches.
The first approach was to generate the arithmetic mean of the responses
for each factor-year (launch costs in 1986, for example). The incremental
differences, or “deltas,” between successive yearly means were calculated and
used as the marginal change data. This approach, however, was seen to have
some shortcomings. As anticipated, the small sample size and diversity of
respondents gave rise to a substantial sample variance in the raw data for some
of the factor-years. The level of variance suggested that the content validity of
the data (whether the data were a representative sample of the characteristics of
the environment) was an issue to be addressed. (A detailed discussion of the
validity issues of the research is contained in Chapter 4). Due to these
shortcomings, this approach was abandoned.
In order to address the content validity issue, the second approach was
devised. It allowed the ancillary data (identification of related events and
additional comments) provided by the respondents to be incorporated into a
filtering process which employed a consensus seeking algorithm (described
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below) and a polling scheme to reinforce a majority opinion regarding the
direction of change in the marginal factor-year data.
The approach was implemented by first generating the incremental
changes in the factor-year data for each of the respondents, for successive year
pairs. Using respondent S-1-1 as an example, the data provided for launch
costs in 1992 and 1993 were 5.75 and 6.25, respectively. The incremental
change, then, is +0.50, or +5% of full scale. The incremental changes so derived
were compared among respondents, and aggregate data points generated
based on the following rules for inclusion.
If 75% or more of the respondents for that factor indicated the
same direction of change (positive or negative), a consensus was
assumed and those in agreement were used to generate an
average. The ancillary data were consulted to see if there existed
any factual evidence to overrule the consensus. The ancillary data
were also consulted for explanation of any “outliers” (incremental
changes that differed from the average by more than 25% of full
scale). If the ancillary data conclusively demonstrated that the
outlier was a result of faulty interpretation or assumption, it was
discarded: otherwise it was retained.
If a 75% consensus was not observed, the ancillary data were
consulted to determine if there was conclusive evidence of the
direction of change. In the absence of any such evidence, the
arithmetic mean of all the incremental changes was used as the
data point for that factor-year pair.
The data generated by this second approach were used in the remainder of the
analysis.
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Development and Analysis of Phase Plane Diagrams
In order to examine the nonlinear dynamic relationships between the
factors, it is valuable to plot their trajectories over time. A phase plane diagram,
as suggested by Priesmeyer (1992), is constructed by plotting the marginal
change data of any two factors on Cartesian coordinates. Figure 3-3 is the
phase plane diagram which compares the marginal changes in the “Launch
Cost” factor to those of the “Legal/Regulatory Environment” factor. The
trajectory of the relationship between these two factors is shown for changes in
the year-pairs 1985-1986 through 1993-1994. The arrow represents the
direction of time progression. The axis scales are in terms of percentage of full
scale change on the ratio measurement scale used in collecting data. Since the
factors are all macroscopic in nature, it is assumed that the decision maker has
no significant influence over changes in the factor levels. Therefore, there is no
designation of independent and dependent variables in the phase plane
diagrams. The axes are chosen arbitrarily.
There are several important pieces of information that can be drawn from
examination of these diagrams. Those which are generic to this analysis are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Periodicity
The phase plane, as is evident in Figure 3-3, is divided into four
quadrants, with the Cartesian coordinate origin at their intersection. A data point
at the origin would indicate no change in either factor. Points in Quadrant 1
indicate positive changes in both factors, while those in Quadrant 3 indicate
negative changes in both factors. Quadrants on the minor axis (Quadrants 2
and 4) indicate positive changes in one factor accompanied in time by negative
changes in the other. The visits to these quadrants by the trajectories can
indicate some kind of periodicity, which implies some predictability, or a lack of
periodicity, which is indicative of a higher order of chaotic behavior and little or
no predictability. Priesmeyer uses a method of determining periodicity by
observing the four most recent marginal changes. If all four are in the same
quadrant, there are no oscillations between the factors and it is identified as a
“Period 1” trajectory. If the four observations are confined to two quadrants, a
tendency toward a simple, bi-polar oscillation is indicated, and the trajectory is
identified as a “Period 2.” If all four quadrants are visited, there is a suggestion
of oscillation of the two factors at different frequencies (e.g., one may switch
sense every year while the other switches every two years). Repeatability of the
four quadrant sequence would need to be verified from earlier data to verify this
behavior, which is identified as a “Period 4” trajectory. Any trajectories which do
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not follow such patterns are considered to be in high order chaos and are
identified as “Period 8.”
All of the factor-pair phase planes were classified in this manner. To
evaluate factor-pair relationships for transitions in periodicity (becoming more or
less chaotic) the same process was applied to the four data points immediately
preceding the final four.
Prior to the foregoing classification of the factor-pair relationships, each
of the phase planes were examined qualitatively by the researcher to determine
the existence of any pattern in the trajectories which might indicate where the
next data point might lie. This was accomplished by observing the trajectory
and making a mark on the plot at the location considered most likely for the next
data point. Since there was a significant potential for invalid data due to
researcher bias (a pre-disposed notion of the factor relationships) in this
process, others who were not part of the research and were considered to have
little knowledge of the environment in question were enlisted to repeat that
analysis. They were told only that it was a time series of data and that their
responses should be based on whatever pattern the plot appeared to be
generating. Data were recorded from the researcher and four additional
“analysis respondents,” noting the quadrant of the projected next data point and
whether that point was positioned closer to or farther from the origin.
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This process of next point prediction might give rise to some questions
concerning reliability of the resultant data. How is it possible for someone with
no knowledge of the system to accurately predict what it will do next?
Priesmeyer (1992) treats this issue in his discussion of visioning as a forecasting
and decision making tool. He makes several credible arguments. First, he
contends that, since the system is acknowledged to be chaotic, standard
objective forecasting models (extrapolation, econometric, segmentation and the
like) provide little insight. Secondly, since the complexity precludes exact
numerical prediction of behavior, it is more appropriate to observe the dynamic
changes in the system as predictors of “realms” of future behavior. Thirdly, that
awareness of the identity and values of the factors represented on the axes is
not required to obtain meaningful data. The use of the naive analysts herein
was prompted by Priesmeyer’s method of visioning a future for an organization.
He selected his “next point” from a phase plane without paying any attention to
the values of the parameters. He describes the process as follows:
I chose a position that simply looked right - it looked appropriate
given the pattern on the screen. It looked consistent and
reasonable with the pattern of things. It seems important that the
proposed position was chosen without regard to the numbers. It is
a future condition that seems consistent with the current state of
the system and the apparent forces that control the behavior of the
system. (Priesmeyer 1 9 9 2,1 79-180)
The implication is that one need not know (and is perhaps better off not
knowing) the nature of the system. All that is required is recognition of a pattern:
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something that the human mind is especially well suited to. In the case of the
process of generating the next point data herein, it is considered an advantage
for the analysts to be unaware of the mechanisms of the behavior, in order to
preclude the potential of perceived causal relationships contaminating the
analysis.
This is an important issue when considering the generalizability of the
methodology. There is no requirement for researchers to be domain experts in
either the decision environment or in the application of nonlinear dynamic
systems techniques.
The periodicity and “next-point” projections were used to isolate factorpair relationships which are most likely to contain information regarding future
behavior and present the possibility of inter-factor causal relationships. Each
factor was compared with the set of nine remaining factors. In each set, the
factor-pairs which exhibited a low periodicity (2 or 1) for the latest four year
period, and either decreasing or consistent periodicity over the two four year
periods were first isolated. From that group, the single factor-pair which
exhibited the lowest and most consistent periodicity and most consistent next
point quadrant selection was selected for further analysis. This process yielded
one factor-pair for each factor.
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Limit Cycles
A limit cycle is the trajectory of the changing relationships between factors
as it is plotted on the phase plane. Generally, there are two types of limit cycles
of interest here.
In the first, the dynamic relationship remains within an observed region
(not necessarily in one quadrant) of the phase plane over the ten year period of
observation, reversing its direction whenever it appears to be headed out of the
region. Figure 3-3 illustrates such behavior. It is likely that the trajectory is
bound to an attractor of some kind. An attractor is some point or set of points
(which are not necessarily identifiable) which define a “basin” or domain of
behavior from which the system will not stray unless acted on by some external
stimulus. Even though the relationship may display high order chaotic behavior,
the attractor applies some constraint to the behavior. As related by Ashby:
“That something is predictable implies that there exists a constraint” (Ashby
195 6,1 32). Without any constraint on the system, there would be an infinite
variety of possible states, all behavior would be random, and no information
would be obtainable. So the existence of an attractor allows some information
(in terms of what the trajectory is unlikely to do, more than what it absolutely will
do) to be imparted.
The second potential kind of behavior involves an “escape” from an
attractor due to some external stimulus. Such behavior is illustrated in Figure
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3-4. This behavior is the most prominent cause of what has been termed (and
identified in the analysis as) Period 1. Even though it may be escaping an
attractor, the trajectory, having remained in the same quadrant for at least four
consecutive years, is likely to persist in that quadrant unless the changes have
been diminishing in magnitude. This too provides some information regarding
the relationship between the two factors involved.
The information obtained from the limit cycles was used to support the
identification of those relationships most likely to contain information regarding
future behavior. The results are discussed in Chapter 4.

Development of System Uncertainty Index
Ashby (1956) defines variety as the quantity of distinguishable elements
in a given set or possible states that a system can assume. As discussed in the
prior section, for information to be extracted from the system (a reduction in
uncertainty), there also must be some constraint, for without constraint all
changes of system state would be random. In terms of the factor-pair dynamic
behavior examined herein, variety can be considered to be a function of the
number of possible states that the two factors might take at any given time.
Constraint can be considered to be imposed by the presence of an attractor,
which limits the excursions of the dynamic trajectory to a specific realm.
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Pursuant to this discussion of variety and constraint, it can be stated that
if the system constraints are relaxed and the possible number of states
increases, then the uncertainty associated with that system increases. The data
used in this analysis is the set of marginal changes between pairs of decision
factors. Increasing rates of change, then, with the knowledge that they cannot
continue to increase indefinitely, can be said to be indicative of greater variety
and/or a relaxation of constraint since, in the phase plane, those conditions
would expand the boundaries of a limit cycle, or perhaps escape the current
attractor entirely.
On the phase planes, the magnitude of change can be expressed by the
magnitude of vectors extending from the origin to the data points, as shown in
Figure 3-5. Increasing vector magnitudes, then, will indicate increasing rates of
change (and, consequently, increasing uncertainty) relating to the dynamic
interaction of the factor-pair.
For this research, the System Uncertainty Index (SUI) is operationally
defined as the sum of the absolute values of those vector magnitudes in a given
time period (one year, in this study) for the system under investigation. The
analysis includes treatment of each factor as related to the remaining nine, and
also the entire system of 45 factor-pair interactions.
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Summary of Methodological Process
The methodology described in this chapter is considered to be a primary
contribution of this research. The technique of identifying and correlating the
sectors of the decision environment and the factors affecting those decisions
evolved experientially over a period of three years of interaction with the
commercial space infrastructure as illustrated in Figure 3-1. The primary data
gathering instrument was designed to make use of available computer
technology and facilitate participation from a broad spectrum of respondents who
were geographically dispersed. As discussed in Chapter 2, the analysis
techniques were derived from research in the field of nonlinear dynamics. New
ways of analyzing and presenting the data resulted in the formulation of two
hypotheses (hh and H2, to be presented in Chapter 4) which represent potential
tools for reduction of uncertainty in complex, nonlinear, dynamic decision
environments. Figure 3-6 is a pictorial representation of the process of
methodological development.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND RESULTS

The following paragraphs present and discuss the findings and results of
the data analysis.

Filtered Marginal Change Data
The data set derived from the polling/filtering method for marginal change
data described in Chapter 3, and decision rationale for each data point are
presented in Appendix E. The data set is reproduced here as Table 4-1. These
are the data used in the remainder of the analysis.

TABLE 4-1
FILTERED MARGINAL CHANGE DATA
Year Pair

*85786

*

86/87

*87788

*

88/*89

‘89790

*90791

*91792

*92793

*93794

Launch Activity
Launch Costs
Legal/Reg. Environ.

-

59.69

-

5.00

5.62

1.64

18.13

1.33

5.78

3.36

-

-

1.67

-

2.92

-

0.31

2.29

0

1.25

2.03

3.75

1.7

5.98

5.5

3.96

4.48

12.25

0.27

•

4.64

-

3.3

Fed. Adm in. Support

2.41

4.8

6.5

4.64

0.31

-

1.96

-

1.25

-

5.09

Competition
New Technology

-

5.88

1.88

12.19

16.57

9.27

19

Public Support
Academic Research

-

1.25

-

13.96

-

-

19.79

-

1.09

NASA Support
DoD Support

-

1.48

-

1.17

-

0.27

3.04

1.76

3.84

9.22

0.78

11.72

-

0.98

0.94

1.34

7.14

2.41

10.94

4.64

4.63

-

-

1.43

4.38

-

6.5

-

4.07

-

2.5

-

5.63

-

1.13

-

0.98

2.03

-

1.25

3.13

-

0.16

-

1.72

-

4.22

-

7.71

0.15

0.78

-

-

5.63

-

1.56

-

0.08

-

6.33

3.21

3.3

0.63

6.57

1.09

1.07

6.72

10.36

68
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Phase Planes for Pair-Wise Comparison of Marginal
Changes in Decision Factors
There are certain repeatable limit cycle patterns which are characteristic
of low order chaos. Classical Period 1 behavior is described by either no
change in either factor or a constant change in one or both. In any case, the
limit cycle is confined to one quadrant on the phase plane (or to the origin, if
neither factor changes) and is (theoretically) described by a single point. Figure
4-1 a shows a more realistic pattern which might be observed, with a tight
clustering in one area.
Classic Period 2 behavior involves oscillation between Quadrants 1 and
3, indicating a positive change in both factors in one time period, followed by a
negative change in both in the following period. The limit cycle would trace a
continuous path close to the major axis of the phase plane, as shown in Figure
4-1 b. A limit cycle traversing the minor (Quadrant 2 - Quadrant 4) axis is also
possible. Other common Period 2 behavior is characterized by alternating
positive and negative changes in one factor, while the other factor remains
relatively constant. The limit cycle would appear similar to that of Figure 4-1 c.
Classic Period 4 behavior is exemplified by the “bow-tie” pattern of the
limit cycle, as shown in Figure 4-1 d. This pattern is caused by one factor
changing sense every period (the vertical axis in figure 4-1 d) while the other
changes sense every second period (the horizontal axis in 4-1 d).
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With the ten factors, there are 45 pair-wise comparisons possible.

A

complete set of the phase plane diagrams is provided in Appendix F.
None of the phase plane trajectories shown in Appendix F are observed
to demonstrate any of the foregoing low-order limit cycle behavior over the entire
ten year period of investigation, thus indicating that all are described by a higher
order of chaotic behavior. That is not to say, however, that no information can
be derived. As Priesmeyer contends, complex patterns of behavior are driven by
the combination of many lower-order chaotic interactions which are themselves
deterministic, but too numerous to allow for direct observation.
The implication from the current data, then, is that extremely complex
environmental forces are at work, which defy precise measurement and
quantitative prediction of system behavior. It is also possible that factors other
than the ones considered are affecting the system behavior.
Recent behavior (over the last four years) and projected behavior (for
next year) do demonstrate some greater consistency, which allows certain
relationships to be isolated and examined further to support generation of
hypotheses via the analysis technique described for periodicity in Chapter 3.
The data from that portion of the analysis are presented as Appendix G.
Figure 4-2 is the phase plane diagram for the NASA Support/Launch Cost
factor-pair, which appears as Factor-Pair 16 in Appendix G. The trajectory
traced by the dynamic interaction (in terms of phase plane quadrant visited) is
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Figure 4-2. Phase Plane With “Next Point" Projections
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listed chronologically. As is evident from Figure 4-2, the trajectory has remained
in Quadrant 4 for the past four years. In the immediately preceding four year
period, the trajectory visited Quadrants 3, 2 and 4. Under the classification
scheme described in Chapter 3, the behavior of this interaction shifted from
Period 8 (high-order chaos) to Period 1 (low-order chaos), as also shown in the
“Periodicity” data field of Appendix G.
The “Projected Behavior” data field in Appendix G summarizes the results
of the “next point” projections provided by the analysis respondents and the
researcher. In the data field, the dual notation for each response indicates the
projected quadrant number and whether the next point identified was closer to
(“IN") or further from (“OUT”) the phase plane origin than the last historical data
point. These projections are also plotted as points labeled “R” and “1” through
“4 ” in Figure 4-2, which illustrates, for this factor-pair, a consensus on the
projected quadrant and a near-consensus on divergence from the origin.
Additional illustrations of phase plane diagrams containing next point projections
are provided in Appendix I.
The end result of that analysis is a listing of the most stable and
predictable factor-pair relationship (lowest historical periodicity, supported by
consensus regarding projected behavior) for each factor, as presented in Table
4-2. A graphical representation which more clearly shows these relationships is
presented as Figure 4-3.
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TABLE 4-2
M OST STABLE INTER-FAC TO R RELATIONSHIPS
Prime Factor
Launch Activity
Launch Cost
Legal/Reg. Environ.
Fed. Admin. Support
Competition
New Technology
Public Support
Academic Research
NASA Support
DoD Support

Related Factor
Launch Cost
Academic Research
Launch Cost
NASA Support
Academic Research
NASA Support
DoD Support
DoD Support
Launch Cost
Academic Research

Periodicity
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

Quadrant
1
4
1
3
4
4
2
2
4
2

In the figure, bi-directional arrows depict factor-pair relationships
exhibiting the lowest order of chaos and most consistent next point predictions.
The arrows are annotated with information concerning the projected future
trajectories. Arithmetic signs at either end of the arrows indicate the direction of
the marginal change of the connected factor. Adjacent to each arrow is the
quadrant the trajectory is projected to visit, and an indication of whether the
trajectory is projected to converge toward or diverge from the phase plane origin.
The most striking observation from Figure 4-3 is that one factor, Launch
Cost, appears to be central in the diagram. It is directly linked to more factors
than any of the others. The implication of this is that launch cost is a focal point
in the decision system since it reacts more predictably in conjunction with the
greatest number of other factors. From the point of view of a passive decision
maker, it would be the best (but certainly not the only) variable in the system to
use as a barometer. From the point of view of a proactive decision maker or
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policy maker, efforts to alter the cost of launch activities would be most likely to
provide maximum leverage on the behavior of the decision environment.
Based on knowledge of the space launch industry, this conclusion is
appropriate. The primary impediment to space exploration over the years has
been the cost of space transportation (current estimates are between $5,000
and $10,000 per pound to low earth orbit).
Presentation of data in this manner can also lead to discovery of
unimagined dynamic interactions which affect the system. As an example,
consider the interaction between launch costs and launch activity shown in
Figure 4-3. On the surface, it might seem that there would be a causal
relationship in which decreasing launch costs would engender increasing launch
activity. The data, however, indicate that the trajectory of the dynamic
interaction between these two factors has spent most of its recent history in
Quadrant 1, and is projected to return there by the majority of analysis
respondents. Quadrant 1 is visited when the two factors are increasing
simultaneously. An alternative explanation which could account for this behavior
is that as the demand for launch capacity increases, in the absence of an
increase in that capacity, the cost rises. In terms of the decision regarding
whether or not to invest in space launch infrastructure, this kind of dynamic, if
proven valid, would have a great deal of relevance.
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Not all of the relationships in the figure are as readily decipherable.
There are two possible explanations. The first is that the limitations of the data
gathering process (to be discussed in detail subsequently) have led to an
insufficient number of raw data points to develop a complete set of valid
interactions. The other possibility is that there are dynamic relationships
between factors that are unfamiliar to the researcher, and which warrant further
investigation.
The foregoing discussion does not imply that interactions other than those
isolated in Figure 4-3 cannot cause unexpected changes in the decision
environment. It also is not offered as a proof of causality, since that data did not
generate conclusive evidence of long term, repeatable periodic behavior. It
does imply that causal relationships are more likely in the interactions of lower
order chaos that have been isolated. Ashby (1956), in discussing Black Box
Theory, makes the point that some systems are too complex for analysis of their
internal mechanisms. System behavior, then, becomes predictable by observing
how its outputs react in response to certain stimuli. Applying that theoretical
perspective here implies that if certain dynamic relationships persist with a low
order of chaos, even in the absence of an obvious one-to-one causal
relationship, there is a useful element of predictability.
In the absence of other decision support data, or as a way of augmenting
other data, this methodology serves to identify the dynamic relationships which
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possess a greater degree of predictability. In order to ensure robustness in the
decision process, this kind of analysis should be repeated at specified intervals,
and/or whenever the possibility of an extraordinary event arises.

In the decision

environment under study herein, one of the decisions supported would be to
invest in additional space launch infrastructure of the nature which would reduce
the cost of space access.
This methodology also serves another useful purpose. It provides a
framework which focuses attention on system behavior, rather than on
microanalysis using statistical data. Observing the trajectories and limit cycles
of marginal change data on phase plane diagrams, as pointed out by
Priesmeyer, has the potential to shed light on relationships which define system
behavior in a way that conventional statistical data do not. Awareness of these
relationships add conceptual depth to existing predictive tools such as scenario
generation and “what i f analyses. The policy or decision maker armed with this
information is better prepared to deal with highly complex and uncertain
environments.

System Uncertainty Index (SUI)
As discussed in Chapter 3 (and illustrated in Figure 3-5), the numerical
value of the SUI, for a given one-year time interval, is the absolute sum of the
magnitudes of the vectors from the phase plane origin to the trajectories of all of
the factor-pairs. W hile these values have no absolute meaning, trends and
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points of inflection in the index provide significant information. If the values are
observed to be increasing in successive time intervals, it can be concluded that
the trajectories (on average) are diverging from the origin, thereby
encompassing a larger state space for potential behavior. The greater number
of possible states that the system can assume equates to greater aggregate
system variety and uncertainty (Ashby, 1956). It is, therefore, a measure of the
amount of risk inherent in the investment decision.
Figure 4-4 shows the composite SUI for all decision factor-pair dynamic
relationships. There are three important characteristics of the plotted data. The
first is the high peak evident in the data from 1985 to 1986. The space shuttle
Challenger explosion occurred in early 1986. This event had serious
repercussions throughout the international space community. A high degree of
uncertainty is, therefore, not unexpected in that timeframe. The second feature
of interest is the peak in the two year period from 1988 to 1990. According to
ancillary data provided by the survey respondents, a significant number of new
launch service providers emerged during this time period, having a significant
impact on the competitive environment.
The third, and perhaps most important feature of the plotted data of
Figure 4-4 is the consistent upward swing over the most recent two year period.
According to the ancillary data supplied, the timeframe coincides with the onset
of cutbacks in federal funding for those NASA, DoD and research programs that
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Figure 4-4. Composite System Uncertainty Index

are supporting space activities: a phenomenon which continues through the
present. The unrest and uncertainty in these major U.S. infrastructure elements
has pervaded the targeted decision environment. Data from the analysis
respondents indicates that the trend will persist. Of their responses regarding
the direction of the next point on the phase planes, 69.3% indicated that the
next data point would diverge from the origin. It is also noteworthy that in Figure
4-3, seven of the nine interactions were predicted to be diverging.
This increasing trend in the level of uncertainty in the decision
environment should act as a warning signal to potential investors that the risks
are increasing. It must be noted, however, that Figure 4-4 only depicts rate of
change in the dynamic environment. Given that some kinds of change can be
beneficial (even though a steadily increasing rate of change is indicative of
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instability), it is advisable to further investigate the elements which contribute
most significantly to this rise in the level of uncertainty.
Table 4-3 contains the SUI data for each of the factors as compared to
the other nine. Graphic representations of these data are contained in Appendix
H. Remembering that the ancillary data indicated that the increased level of
uncertainty related to federal funding cutbacks and agency shake-ups, the SUI
data for four factors, Support of the Federal Administration, Level of Academic
Research, NASA Support and DoD Support, were examined, with the following
observations concerning the two most recent time periods:

•

Table 4-3 shows that the rate of change in the level of support by the
federal administration declined slightly (from 42 to 41) and then rose
sharply (from 41 to 67). As shown in Table 4-1, the contribution of this
factor to the system uncertainty has been comprised of changes in the
negative (undesirable) direction, that is, a reduction in the level of
support by the federal administration.

•

The rate of change in the level of academic research rose dramatically
in each of the two periods (from 41 to 55 and from 55 to 85). The
contribution of this factor has also been in the negative (undesirable)
direction, that is, a reduction in the level of research activity.

•

•

The rate of change in the level of NASA support declined slightly (from
40 to 39) and then increased sharply (from 39 to 75). The contribution
of this factor has also been in the negative (undesirable) direction, that
is, a reduction in the level of support by NASA.
The rate of change in the level of DoD support rose substantially in
each of the time periods (from 72 to 99 and from 99 to 132). The
contribution from this factor has been in the positive (desirable)
direction, that is, an increase in the level of support by DoD.
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TABLE 4-3
SYSTEM UNCERTAINTY INDICES
FACTOR
Launch Activity
Launch Coat
Legal/Ref. Environ.
Fed. Admin. Support
Competition
New Technology
Public Support
Academic Research
NASA Support
DoD Support

t85P*S
341
98
98
101
98
109
96
222
97
94

•S6TS7

70
59
76
69
75
97
133
53
53
60

**7/*88
68
44
67
74
48
112
74
48
44
54

•88TS9
57
53
68
71
124
177
83
55
54
64

*89/,90
171
59
71
52
159
55
68
63
54
52

•90^91
41
38
116
40
93
58
47
38
66
40

*91/*92
65
39
37
42
39
104
64
41
40
72

*92/*93
50
43
58
41
75
58
40
55
39
99

•93T94

49
60
58
67
54
65
49
85
75
132

All four of the factors exhibited increasing rates of change. Three of the four are
observed to be changing in undesirable directions.

An investor aware that the

uncertainty in the environment is increasing and that the factors contributing to
that uncertainty are changing in the undesirable direction would be better
informed regarding potential risk, and adjust his or her required rate of return or
payback period accordingly. In terms of the space launch infrastructure
investment decision posed as the object of this study, the findings imply that the
most robust strategy would be to piecemeal the infrastructure development,
committing funds initially to those elements which can be implemented quickly
and be capable of generating financial returns even in the absence of any
further development.
W hat is also noteworthy about the data of Table 4-3 is that the SUI for the
Launch Cost factor is consistently lower than that of the other factors. This
correlates well with the finding discussed above and shown in Figure 4-3.
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Summary and Hypotheses
The findings have demonstrated that the methodology developed herein
can provide some utility in the arena of large-scale decision making and policy
formulation. It can serve as another approach in an eclectic schema (Armstrong,
1968) of forecasting and policy decisions. This study is a preliminary
investigation of the use of nonlinear dynamics techniques in this type of decision
environment. Its size and scope were limited by the availability of time and
resources, and its objective was to develop some hypotheses which provide
direction for future research. Based on the findings discussed above, the
following hypotheses are posed for further investigation:

Hv

The analysis of trajectories and limit cycles of marginal change
data as described herein identifies dynamic relationships among
decision factors which are most likely to influence the decision
environment, when that environment is large, quantitative data is
not readily available, and there exists a high degree of uncertainty
and nonlinearity.

H2:

The System Uncertainty Index, as developed herein, is a measure
of the aggregate uncertainty, and can support decision making by
isolating trends in the magnitude of uncertainty in a given decision
environment or making comparisons of uncertainty/risk levels
between various decision environments.

Limitations
The objective of this research has not been to validate hypotheses, but to
investigate new ways of reducing uncertainty and generate hypotheses
regarding tools and techniques which may be of use in strategic decision making
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and policy formulation. There are certain limitations implicit in the methodology,
most of which arise as a result of the practical constraints on resources and time
to complete.

The limitations fall into two general categories, biases and data

validity, and are discussed in the paragraphs to follow.

Biases
For expediency in this study, the researcher selected the decision factors
based on experience and content analysis of pertinent documentation. W hile
the list of documentation (Appendix A) is considered comprehensive, it is by no
means all inclusive. Therefore, some researcher bias may be associated with
the selection of factors. However, for purposes of this exploratory research,
potential omissions are not considered a serious threat to the validity of the data
or results.

In future research, this type of bias can be avoided by allowing the

survey respondents (domain experts) to select the factors as part of the data
collection process.
The survey instrument and its execution, due to the very limited personal
contact involved, were relatively free from any researcher bias. Biases of the
individual respondents were offset, to the greatest extent possible, by the
directed sampling techniques which solicited respondents from diverse sectors
of the environment.

The limited sample size, however, cannot guarantee the

absence of respondent bias.
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The object of the analysis phase was to use the theoretical perspective of
nonlinear dynamics to examine the data for meaningful patterns and indications
of useful information. This kind of process is subject to researcher bias of the
nature of seeing patterns which do not exist or “force fitting” data into anticipated
results. Analysis of a judgmental nature (prediction of the next point on a phase
plane) is especially susceptible to this type of bias. To provide integrity to the
process, four people unfamiliar with the subject matter of the research were
enlisted to repeat the analysis process employed by the researcher. They were
provided only the information needed to accomplish the task. Only data points
agreed upon independently by at least four of the five analysts were considered
further.
A potential for researcher bias is also introduced in the filtering process
used to develop the marginal change data for analysis. The risk was mitigated
by a conservative approach which retained all data not proven to be inaccurate
by ancillary data provided by other respondents. Of course there is still some
potential for bias, since the researcher was the sole interpreter of the ancillary
data.

Validity of Data and Results
Since the nature of the study was exploratory and limited resources were
available, the sample size was small. Of twenty-one respondents invited and
agreeing to participate, only eight submitted meaningful data. Consequently, the
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desired breadth of coverage of the sectors of the infrastructure was not
achieved. The target size for responses for a given survey question (from which
the decision factor marginal change data were developed) was a minimum of
five. Of the ten questions, two (those pertaining to launch costs and level of
academic research) received only four responses. All other questions received
at least seven responses. With this limited amount of data, there is an issue of
content validity, which is raised mainly by the potential for sampling errors. The
question that must be addressed is whether the sample data used for analysis is
truly representative of the universe (the decision environment) considered. As
discussed in Chapter 3, the ancillary data collected was intended to, and in fact
did, ameliorate the situation, but there still exists some degree of uncertainty in
this regard.
The objective of the study was to examine decision environments which
are large and difficult to quantify. Accordingly, the questions posed to the
respondents were, by design, highly qualitative, subjective and broad in scope.
The consequence of this is that an issue of construct validity is introduced by the
degree of interpretation left to the respondents. The issue is whether the
respondents were all answering the same questions; that is, whether all
questions were perceived in the same way. Requests for additional supporting
information (the ancillary data) built into the survey instrument met with limited
success. In future research efforts, it would be advisable to include some
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mechanism (Delphi method or automated decision support system, for example)
to arrive at a consensus among respondents based on supporting data extracted
during the process.
The analysis of the dynamic relationships does not fully account for time
lags in the effects of factors on one another. If the lag is relatively short (in the
range of one to three years) the relationship is likely to be evident on the phase
plane diagrams. However, for longer lags (five years or more) such as may be
encountered in a research-technology-launch cost relationship, the proportion of
the lag time to the total time period examined would make it very difficult to
detect any relationship. On the other hand, meaningful effects of perceptions
and expectations regarding causal relationships could certainly influence the
decisions with much shorter delays, and therefore be significant to this analysis.
For example, if a decision maker was aware of a large influx in research activity,
the expectation of resulting reductions in launch costs might make the
investment more appealing. In any case, subsequent research may consider
dealing with this phenomenon by examining phase plane diagrams with variable
time shifts incorporated.

Implications of Results
This research contributes the two hypotheses stated above, and the
accompanying methodological framework, for eliminating some of the
uncertainty in large-scale decision environments characterized by complex
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dynamic relationships and uncertainty regarding future behavior and factors
which influence that behavior. It integrates the theoretical language and analytic
processes of nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory into the language of decision
theory and forecasting (a continuation of that begun by Priesmeyer). The
methodology also encourages a holistic view of decision systems, as opposed to
prediction based on extrapolation of a small number of statistical performance
indicators. Validation of the hypotheses will add to the body of knowledge in
decision theory and forecasting, providing additional tools for use in eclectic
approaches.
A corollary contribution of the research is that the methodology can be
used to support some of the widely used forecasting methodologies.
Approaching the decision environment holistically and focusing on the dynamic
interactions between factors that affect that environment can support the
development of scenarios by illustrating what is and is not likely to occur within
certain timeframes. It can also support “what i f and sensitivity analyses through
its attention to the dynamics of the system.
The methodology described herein has applicability in decision
environments other than that investigated in this study. It would be particularly
applicable in advanced technological domains, rapidly growing industries and
international endeavors, all of which are characterized by dynamic interactions
that have not matured enough to be predictable.
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The implications for future research are primarily concerned with the
issue of validation. The traditional method of validation for a methodology which
treats uncertainty in the future is to “live out” that future, chronicle the outcomes,
and see if they lie within some tolerance bandwidth of the outcomes predicted.
In a dynamic environment characterized by primary uncertainty, however, those
tolerance bands lose their significance because the “ground rules” keep
changing. The utility of the methodology developed herein is not its ability to
predict the future, but its ability to shed light on the dynamic relationships which
shape the future. The process of validation, then, must be a continuously
unfolding and evolving process similar to that employed in robust sequential
decision making. In the robust decision process, adjustments are made at
specific decision points using knowledge acquired since the previous decision to
develop a strategy which retains the greatest number of potentially good
outcomes. In validating the hypotheses posed herein, additional data points can
be added to the phase planes and uncertainty indices as future events unfold,
and compared to the predictions generated. Some of the limitations of this
study, which have been previously discussed, can be overcome in the design of
subsequent data gathering efforts.
There are three additional recommendations for future research. This
study, by design, relied entirely on qualitative data. For some of the factors
(launch activity and launch cost, for example) some quantitative data exists. For
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other factors, related statistics which act as “indicators" of historical performance
(NASA funding levels for space related research as an indicator of the level of
academic research, for example). In future research efforts, these indicators
should be incorporated into the raw data used to generate the marginal change
data, or used as a basis of discussion if a method of consensus is used in the
data gathering process.
The second recommendation addresses the validity issue through
duplicity of findings. To accomplish this, it is recommended that the
methodology be employed in a different research venue and the results
compared. If the second study produces analytical results which appear
reasonable (remembering that validity is not directly demonstrable), then
credence is lent to the methodology.
The third recommendation is to attempt to develop a method of probing
more deeply into the richness of interactions among the decision factors. The
research described herein limited its investigation to pair-wise interactions.
Future research could investigate higher order combinations of factors (three,
four or five at a time).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

This research has been characterized as Exploratory Applied Research.
The value of this type of research rests in its external validity - its ability to be
generalized to other venues of investigation and practice. It is believed that the
methodological process developed herein has broad generalizability.
The methodology is considered the primary contribution of the research.
One of its benefits is that it provides a framework under which complex
relationships can be observed and analyzed via patterns generated in phase
space. This enables analysis of multifaceted decision scenarios by people who
need not be expert in all of the relevant domains and disciplines. There are,
however, some elements of the methodology which are critical to the outcome of
the process. They warrant some further comment.
The most critical process element is the ability to enlist the respondents in
such a manner that all relevant sectors of the environment are represented. The
amount of effort that was expended to design the survey instrument and solicit
respondents for the research was justified. In retrospect, the sample was still
not considered sufficient to accomplish more than the proposition of two
hypotheses based on the analysis of data.
91
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The quality of respondents is also critical. In a less complex and more
mature environment than the one selected for this research, this might not be as
important an issue. In the case of commercial space launch infrastructure,
however, most of the activity has been concentrated in the past decade.
Consequently, finding individuals from all the required sectors who have been
participants for that length of time was somewhat problematic.
In order to obtain a diversity of responses, the research was performed
without any planned collaboration among respondents. But diversity became a
double edged sword. On the one hand, the number of different viewpoints was
maximized, which was beneficial. On the other hand, there was a likelihood that
some sampling error was introduced by differing interpretations of the questions
by the respondents. As stated in Chapter 4, it is the opinion of the researcher
that some up-front cooperative activity among respondents would produce a
more reliable set of data.
In actuality, there were instances of unintended respondent collaboration
in the research. It was learned during follow-up contact that many of the
respondents were acquainted with one another. Some of those relationships
were known beforehand, but many were not. O f the eight responses used for
analysis there was some degree of collaboration. In one instance, a survey
diskette which was sent to one respondent was returned by another (the
diskettes were coded for identification). It was later learned that both parties
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had supplied information in certain areas, and that some discussion had taken
place. This in no way invalidated the data. On the contrary, this particular
response was observed to have far more substantiating ancillary data than any
of the other responses. The emergence of these relationships among
respondents reinforces the observation that in this venue, there is a very small
universe of potential respondents from which to draw a sample. The need for a
methodology which maximizes sample size and the amount of information
derived from each respondent becomes evident.
The hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 emerged as a result of looking at
the numerical and pictorial/graphical data in a number of different ways. It is not
the contention of the researcher that these hypotheses constitute an exhaustive
list of the possibilities. The two that are presented meet the criteria of
supporting actual observations of the environment (that is, they seem
reasonable in light of current events), and of being of practical use to the
decision maker.
To provide closure to the research and its outcomes, a look back at the
initial research question posed in Chapter 1 is necessary. That question,
restated, is: “Should an investment be made to develop infrastructure to support
commercial space launch activities?" This research did not arrive at a simple
“yes or no” answer to that question, and was not intended to, since the final
decision in a real situation would also encompass factors relevant to the
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decision maker and his or her goals, objectives and risk tolerance. W hat does
emerge from the analysis are two statements regarding such an investment
which, with consideration given to the stated limitations of the research, could be
used to assist in the strategic decision process.
“If one were to invest in space launch infrastructure, the best return
on investment is likely to come from activities which directly
contribute to the reduction of launch costs.”
“In consideration of such an investment, one would be well advised
to adjust the desired rate of return upward to compensate for the
increasing level of uncertainty and risk in the environment.”
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Literature Reviewed
Periodicals
Space News. Army Times Publishing Company
Washington Technology. TechNews, Inc.
Aerospace America. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Aviation W eek and Space Technology. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
NASA Tech Briefs. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Innovations. Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology
Space Technology Innovation. NASA Office of Space Access and Technology
Technology Transfer Business. TechNews, Inc.
Discover. Time, Inc.
High Technology. Infotechnology Publishing Corp.
AIAA Student Journal. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
NASA Spin-off. NASA Office of Commercial Programs
Space FAX Daily. Space Age Publishing Company
Commercial Space Opportunities. NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
Space Calendar. Space Age Publishing Company
Space. The Shephard Press
Inside Wallops. NASA Wallops Flight Facility

Reports and Documents
Design Challenges for Tomorrow’s Manned Launch Systems. NASA Langley Research
Center
Human Transportation System Study Final Report. NASA Johnson Spaceflight Center
Human Transportation System Study Architecture Evaluation Tool. NASA Johnson
Spaceflight Center and Lockheed Engineering and Services Co.
Launch System Study Final Report: A Demonstration of Robustness for Space
Transportation Architectures. Old Dominion University, Dept, of Engineering
Management
Infrastructure Study (NAS 8-37588L Marshall Spaceflight Center and General Dynamics
Space Systems Div.
Access to Space Study (Status Briefing ChartsL NASA Access to Space Steering
Committee
U.S. Space Launch Systems. Navy Space Systems Activity
Research and Test Facilities for Development of Technologies and Experiments with
Commercial Applications. NASA Goddard Spaceflight Center
Virginia’s Initiative for Commercial Space Launch Support at Wallops. Virginia’s Center
for Innovative Technology
In-Space Operations: Going to Work in Space. NASA Langley Research Center
Space: America’s New Competitive Frontier. The Business-Higher Education Forum
Commercial Titan Briefing (Commercial Space Risk and Insurance Symposium). Martin
Marietta Commercial Titan, Inc.
Pavload Processing Facilities and Support for Commercial ELV and Shuttle Launches.
Astrotech Space Operations, L.P.
A Survey on the Opinions and Attitudes of Investors on Commercial Space Initiatives.
KPMG Peat Marwick
Accessing Space: A Catalog o Process. Eouipment and Resources for Commercial
Users. NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
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Reports and Documents fCont’d.1
Overview of Policy. Market and Technology Options for Commercial Reusable Re-entry
Satellites. NASA Ames, Office of Commercial Programs and Stanford University
Commercial. Delta Launch Vehicle (Briefing to Commercial Space Risk and Insurance
Symposium. McDonnell Douglas
The Atlas Family: Commercial Launch Services. General Dynamics Commercial
Launch Services
Big. Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option?. U.S. Congress, Office
of Technology Assessment
Commercial Space Ventures: A Financial Perspective. U.S. Department of Commerce
Virginia Space Resource Directory. Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology
A Post Cold W ar Assessment of U.S. Space Policy. Vice President’s Space Policy
Advisory Board
Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space Program f1993V National Space
Council
The Future of the U.S. Space Industrial Base. Vice President’s Space Policy Advisory
Board
The Future of the U.S. Space Launch Capability. Vice President’s Space Advisory Board
1992 Research and Technology Report. Goddard Space Flight Center
United States Space Directory (19931. Space Publications
NASA Spinoff (1 9 9 1 .1 9 9 2 ). NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
Virginia Focuses on Space. Virginia’s Center for Innovative Technology
Commercial Experiment Transporter (COMET) technical and management
reports, Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research
Final Report (to CIT): The Center for Commercial Space Infrastructure. Old Dominion
University, Department of Engineering Management
Commercial Space Infrastructure Needs Assessment Survey: Report of Findings. Old
Dominion University, School of Business and Public Administration
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Contacts Established (bv Infrastructure Sector)
Commercial Space Industry
Name
Mr. Roy Slinchum
Mr. Dm Qazi
Mr. Frederick Perkins
Ms. Bonnie Morris
Ms. Christine Gatewood
Mr. Hollister Cantus
Dr. Phillip Cheney
Mr. Dick Uliman
Mr. Barry Abzug
Mr. John Mehoves
Mr. Otto Hoemig
Dr. Richard Fleeter
Mr. Larry Yermack
Mr. Ron Hodge
Mr. Jesse Moore
Mr. Ed Yablonski
Mr. Dave Johnson
Mr. Robert Cowls
Mr. Theodore Nanz
Mr. Sam Mihara
Ms. Bonnie Soodik
Mr. Steve Lawson
Mr. R. S. Sapp
Dr. Mourice Miller
Mr. Robert Young
Mr. Ken Johnson
Mr. Robert Hager
Mr. Robert Horowitz
Mr. Richard Grant
Ms. Elyse Nicholson
Mr. Henry Dinenno
Ms. Mary Lou Kromer
Ms. Ginger Emry
Mr. Don Carter
Mr. Paul Hirsch
Mr. Robert Glaysher
Mr. Mark Schwene
Mr. Bill Moore
Mr. Steve Pilcher
Mr. Paul Bachar
Mr. Fred Stang
Ms. Elaine Hinsdale
Mr. Ed Yablonski
Mr. Dom Mack
Mr. Ivor Knight
Mr. Joseph Jerger
Mr. Howard Svigals

Organization
Hughes STX
Hughes STX
Standard Space Platforms Corp.
Stanford Telecommunications, Inc.
General Dynamics
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
Raytheon Co.
ITT Defense, Inc.
ITT Aerospace
Orbital Sciences Corp.
International Microspace
Aero Astro Corp.
Fairchild Space and Defense Corp.
SPOT Image Corp.
Ball Corp.
American Mobile Satellite Corp.
CTA, Inc.
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Co.
SPOT Image Corp.
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Co.
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Co.
Thiokol Corp.
Lockheed Corp.
Lockheed Engineering and Services Co.
Lockheed Corp.
GE Astrospace
Boeing Missiles and Space Group
GE Astrospace
Boeing Missiles and Space Group
Rockwell Intemational/Rocketdyne
Rockwell International Corp.
Rockwell International Corp.
Rockwell International Corp.
Rockwell International Corp.
Rockwell International Corp.
Rockwell International Corp.
Hughes Space and Communications Co.
Hughes Space and Communications Co.
Hughes Space and Communications Co.
Hughes Space and Communications Co.
Space Systems/Loral
Grumman Aerospace Corp.
American Mobile Satellite Corp.
Integral Systems, Inc.
Communications Satellite Corp.
Space Vector Corp.
GTE Spacenet Corp.
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Commercial Space Industry (Cont'd.t
Name
Mr. Alvin Reeser
Mr. Thomas Zakrzewski
Mr. Phillip Bruce
Mr. Mark Daniels
Mr. Tom Ramberg
Mr. Chris Bourassa
Mr. Bill Grieser
Mr. David Sterling
Mr. R. D. Anderson
Mr. Rick Andrews
Mr. John Jaques
Mr. Kurt Bassett
Mr. John Lent
Mr. John DeGeneres
Mr. Feltus Kennedy
Mr. Robert Beale
Mr. Bill Benner
Mr. Henry Beny
Mr. Francis Bloomcamp
Mr. H. L. Brewer
Mr. James Bums
Mr. Joseph Casas
Mr. James Cannon
Mr. Richard Coffman
Mr. Richard Cochran
Mr. Ted Cors
Mr. William Crowe
Mr. J. E. Cvik
Ms. Christine DeHaven
Mr. Ben DeVane
Mr. Thomas Ehrenberger
Mr. Donald Elliott
Mr. James Emory
Mr. Bill Fedor
Mr. Bruce Ferguson
Mr. Terry Feist
Mr. Doyle Franklin
Mr. George Golden
Mr. Patrick Haney
Mr. E. J. Higgins
Mr. Robert Kelly
Mr. Robin Kozelka
Mr. John Langford
Dr. Byron Lichtenberg
Mr. R. A. Magnum
Mr. Kevin McCoy
Mr. Roy Myers
Mr. Landon Overby
Mr. Thomas Pearson
Mr. Howard Pedolsky
Mr. Pete Perkins

Organization
Spacehab, Inc.
Nichols Research Corp.
Space Applications Corp.
EER Systems Corp.
Space Applications Corp.
Storm Integration, Inc.
Storm Integration, Inc.
Motorola, Inc.
Pratt & Whitney
KPMG Peat Marwick
Martin Marietta Corp.
Martin Marietta Civil Space & Communications Co.
Martin Marietta Corp.
Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems Group
Martin Marietta Manned Space Systems Group
General Electric Co.
Unisys Corp.
Engineering, Inc.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Northrup Corp.
Centel Cellular Co.
Spacetec Ventures, Inc.
Technology Applications, Inc.
BDM International, Inc.
Northrup Worldwide Aircraft Services, Inc.
L T Aerospace and Defense Co.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
Raytheon, Co.
The Boeing Co.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
E-Systems
Lockheed Corp.
Litton Data Systems
The Boeing Co.
Orbital Sciences Corp.
General Electric Co.
UNISYS Corp.
Rockwell International/North American Aircraft
Lockheed Corp.
Teledyne Hastings-Raydist
Lockheed Engineering
Loral Electronic Systems
Aurora Flight Sciences Corp.
Payload Systems, Inc.
McDonnell Douglas Corp.
General Dynamics Corp.
Rockwell International
Contel Federal Systems
EER Systems Corp.
Orbital Systems Ltd.
T R W Space and Technology Group
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Commercial Space Industry fCont’d.)
Name

Organization

Mr. Duane Perry
Mr. Richard Price
Mr. Donald Quinn
Mr. Mandell Reynolds
Mr. Vincent Schultz
Mr. Scott Stith
Mr. Richard Stoessner
Mr. Paul Tobin
Mr. Moffette Tharpe
Mr. Marco Zanetti
Mr. Edward Haugland
Mr. Ernest Briel
Dr. Thomas Wright
Mr. Jim Lojocono
Mr. Wesley Weriing
Mr. Michael Kiya
Mr. Wayne Finger
Dr. Marshall Kaplan
Mr. Bill Derdock
Mr. Ron Sabatino
Mr. Ernest Bedegrew
Mr. Edward Matthews
Mr. David McGowan
Mr. Brian Hughes
Mr. Robert Mellor
Mr. Dennis McGinley
Mr. Gene Steiger
Mr. Art Waite
Mr. Art Perry
Mr. Stephen Morgan
Mr. Jack Koletty
Mr. Richard Scredon

Allied-Signal Aerospace Co.
Grumman Corp.
Hughes Aircraft Co.
Computer Sciences Corp.
Booz Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
General Electric Government Services Co.
Sikorsky Aircraft Co.
W yle Laboratories
EER Systems
Martin Marietta Corp
General Research Corp.
BRPH Architects-Engineers
EER Systems
S K W Corporation
EER Systems
S K W Corporation
Reynolds, Smith and Hills, Inc.
Veda Incorporated
Lockheed Space Operations Co.
Lockheed Space Operations Co.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
Conatec, Inc.
Orbital Sciences Corp.
American Rocket Company
Lockheed Space Operations Co.
AlliedSignal, Inc.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.
BRPH Architects-Engineers
American Space Technology, Inc.
Starsys Global Positioning, Inc.
AlliedSignal, Inc.
Veda, Incorporated

Dr. George Garrison
Mr. Joe Pawlick
Mr. Sidney Pauls
Mr. John Emond
Mr. Ray Whitten
Mr. Charles Cockrell
Mr. Larry Rowell
Mr. Ray Stanley
Mr. Terry Potterton
Mr. Ed Dean
Mr. Bruce Underwood
Mr. Sidney Pauls
Mr. John Emond
Mr. Keith Koehler

Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research
Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Office of Commercial Programs
NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA Wallops Flight Facility
NASA Langley Research Center
NASA HQ, Office of Commercial Programs
NASA Wallops Flight Facility

NASA
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Federal. State and Local Government Agencies
Name
Mr. James Cames
Mr. Charles Kline
Dr. Mario Fiori
Mr. Richard Scott
Mrs. Stephanie Myers
Mr. E. W . Davis
Mr. Randy Davis
Mr. Julius Denton
Mr. Arthur Fisher
Ms. Donna Girardot
Mr. Henry Hofheimer
Mr. Terry Holzheimer
Mr. John Hombeck
Ms. Connie Long
Mr. Alvin Tompkins
Mr. Greg Wingfield
Dr. Dana Hamel
Capt. Robert Masten
Col. Edward Nicastri
Ms. Cathleen Magennis
Mr. Peter Fitzpatrick
Mr. James Witherspoon
Mr. Michael Miller
Mr. Jack Bonniwell
Mr. Keith Bull
Hon. Herbert H. Bateman
Ms. Susan Berry
Ms. Patricia Spurlock
Mr. Pat Ladner
Mr. Daniel Kuennen
Mr. W ayne Sterling
Mr. Paul Berge
Ms. Marsha Schachtel
Ms. Shana Dale
Mr. Jeff Hofgard
Mr. Bill Meyer
Maj. James Knauf

Organization
Department of Defense Energy Directorate
U.S. DoT, Office of Commercial Space Transportation
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. DoT, Office of Commercial Space Transportation
U.S. DoT, Office of Commercial Space Transportation
VA Dept, of Economic Development
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
VA Peninsula Economic Development Center
Eastern Shore of VA Economic Development Comm.
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
Future of Hampton Roads
VA Dept, of Economic Development
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
VA Peninsula Chamber of Commerce
Forward Hampton Roads
VA Center for Public/Private Initiatives
U. S. Naval Weapons Station
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
VA Dept, of Economic Development
VA Dept, of Economic Development
VA Department of Economic Development
Virginia's Center for Innovative Technology
Eastern Shore of VA Economic Development Comm.
Eastern Shore of VA Economic Development Comm.
U.S. Congress
Office of Sen. John Warner
Office of Sen. Charles Robb
Alaska Aerospace Development Corp.
MD Rural Development Center
VA Department of Economic Development
Accomack-Northampton Planning District Commission
MD Dept, of Economic and Employment Development
U.S. Congress, Science, Space and Tech. Committee
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
MD Dept, of Economic and Employment Development
USAF, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition

International Entities
Mr. Wang Yan
Mr. Chris Faranetta
Mr. Jeff Manber

China National Aero-Technology Import/Export Corp.
NPO Energia
NPO Energia
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Academic and Research Centers
Name
Ms. Barbara Hale
Dr. Marianna Long
Dr. Charles Bostian
Mr. Donald Bishop
Mr. C. L. Britt
Mr. Suman Ganguly
Mr. J. G. Bowman
Dr. William Glenn
Mr. David Cummings
Dr. John Logsdon

Organization
Center for Cell Research
Center for Macromolecular Crystallography
Center for Commercial Space Communications
Center for Space and Advanced Technology
Research Triangle Institute
Center for Remote Sensing
Institute of Long Range Studies
Space Communications Technology Center
Universities Space Research Association
Space Policy Institute

Legal Providers
Ms. Janice Bellucci
Mr. F. Kenneth Schwetje

Attorney at Law
Aegis Research Corp.

Ms. Karen Davis
Mr. Jim Gifford

Virginian Pilot and Ledger Star
Space News

Media

Financial Providers
Mr. Frank DiBello

Space Vest Management Group

Associations and Omanizations
Ms. Joanne Padrone
Ms. Mary Sandy

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Virginia Aerospace Business Roundtable

Insurance Providers
Mr. Frederick Hauck

international Technical Underwriters, Inc.
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COMMERCIALSPACE
INFRASTRUCTURE

I
I

In support of a Ph.D. Dissertation in Engineering M anagem ent

W ayne W oodham s
D epartm ent of Engineering M anagem ent
Old Dominion University
Norfolk. Virginia 2 3 5 2 9
(8 0 4 )6 8 3 -5 4 7 8

CLICK HERE TO BEGIN SURVEY

]
109

If operating from a floppy disk drive, you must identify th e drive you are using (A or B) by
clicking on the appropriate button below.
iDisk D rive = A: j
D isk D rive = B:

O

If this is your first time through the survey, or if you are unsure of how to
proceed, click on the INSTRUCTIONS button below for a brief tutorial.

If you wish to bypass the tutorial and start the survey now, click on the
START button below.

IN S T R U C T IO N S

START

TUTORIAL
This computerized data gathering instrument was custom designed for this
application, using Microsoft Visual Basic 3.0.
Note th a t this program will not run unless th e DOS S H A R E program is executing. If it is not part
of your A T T O E X E C .B A T file, you must exit Windows and type "S H A R E /L:500" at th e DOS prom pt
hit E N TE R , and restart Windows.

This survey requests that the respondent supply data in one or more of ten topic
areas relating to commercial space activities. You were invited to participate
because of your knowledge in at least one of these areas. Please feel free to
respond in any additional areas in which you feel comfortable.
Also, please feel free to collaborate with colleagues in responding. If a colleague
wishes to respond individaully, please provide his/her name and E-mail (or
postal) address in the final comments section of the survey, or make a copy of
this transmittal for his/her use.
Each screen has command buttons like the ones you see below. Clicking your
mouse button on any of them allows you to control the program execution. Click
on the CONTINUE button to proceed, or the QUIT button if you wish to stop here
to activiate the SHARE program.
CONTINUE

QUIT

- 1

]
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TUTOR/AL
Each d a ta entry screen asks a question relating to the perform ance of some facto r relating to
commercial space, and how it has varied oyer the past ten years. The responses requested are
qualitative rather th an quantitative and are provided by you in a graphic form at such as the one
shown below. The levels are norm alized to a scale of 1 to 10.
W hen responding, first select the year in which the greatest level of th e particular facto r has been
observed, and rate th a t year as a "10". Then rate all other years in comparison.
Enter d a ta by clicking your mouse when the pointer is w here you wish on the grid. Try
experim enting with th e sample grid below.
10 —
T ....................r ....................................
9-

........................................................................................................

7-

6

-

5

4
3
2i 85

86

87

88

89

W hen you're satisfied,
click on C O N TIN U E .

90

91

92

93

94

CONTINUE

j
112
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TUTOR/AL
Above the d ata entry grid appears a bank of "Event" buttons like those below. Clicking on
any one of them will open a screen th a t asks you to identify significant events associated
with the year in question.

A very important use of the data will be to analyze maxima, minima and
points of inflection, so please use the Event buttons to provide anv available
information regarding those phenomena.
Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event
10- r

Note that the Event
buttons are not active in
this tutorial.

976

- ■

5
A

3
2

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

IC O N flN U E ]
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TUTORIAL
N ote that none of the buttons b elow are active except for C O N T IN U E .

To th e right of the d ata entry grid are two additional buttons as
shown to th e right. Clicking on th e DATA S O U R C E button opens
a screen th a t asks you to identify the source of any statistical
d a ta used to support your response.

DATA
SOURCE

Clicking on the C O M M E N T button opens a screen which allows
you to make any additional comments which you might consider
relevant.

COMMENT

The three command buttons which appear at th e bottom of each d ata entry screen are
shown below. Clicking on the N E X T S C R E E N button opens th e next data screen for
use. Clicking on th e S E L E C T S C R E E N button opens a menu from which you can
select any d a ta screen to open. Clicking on the Q U IT button saves all d ata and ends
the survey session. You may quit and restart as many times as you like w ithout losing
data.

N EXT SCREEN

]

SELECT SCREEN

3

To see a sam ple of th e data entry screen, click on C O N TIN U E .

Q U IT

1

C O N T IN U E

I
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TUTOFt/AL

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

D A TA
SOURCE

7-

6
5
A —

3-

COMMENT

2185

86

87

NEXT SCREEN

j

88

89

98

91

92

93

S E L E C T SC R E E N

Q U IT

1

To Yiew a listing of th e questions, click on C O N TIN U E.

]

C O N T IN U E

]
Ol
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PREV/EW OF QUESTIONS
D a ta Entry Screen #1

W h at has b een the relative le ve l of sm all to m id-sized (500 to 0.000 lbs. to LEO)
launch activity o ver the past 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen #2

H ow has the cost p er pound of p ay lo a d mass to LEO. for E xp en d able Launch
V e h ic les , v a rie d o ver the past 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen # 3

H ow strongly has the le g al/reg u la to ry environm ent supported com m ercial space
activities o ver the past 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen #4

H ow strongly has the fe d e ra l adm inistration supported com m ercial space
activities over the past 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen # 5

W h at has b een the relative le ve l of com petition (how m any small to m id-sized
launch providers, world-wide) o ver the p ast 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen #6

W h a t has b een the relative le ve l of new technology introduction for sm all to
m id-sized ELV's and satellites o ver the past 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen # 7

H ow supportive of sp a ce activities has the public been, o ver the past 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen #8

W h a t has been the relative le ve l of s p a c e -re la te d aca d e m ic research activity
o ver the last 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen # 9

H ow has N A SA 's support of com m ercial space v arie d over the past 10 years?

D a ta Entry Screen # 1 0

H ow has D o D 's support of com m ercial sp a ce v a rie d over the past 10 years?

B EG IN S U R V E Y

Q U IT

1

]
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #1 - LAUNCH ACTIVITY

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

DATA
SOURCE

COMMENT

NEXT SCREEN

S E L E C T SC R EE N

Q U IT

1

]

117

]

SCREEN

1 EVENTS

118
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #2 - LAUNCH COSTS

n't* f

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

D ATA
SOURCE

COM MENT

N E X T SC R EE N

Q U IT

SCREEN 2 EVENTS

122
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #3 - REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

D A TA
SOURCE

COM MENT

NEX T SCREEN

SELECT SCREEN

]

QUIT

]

123

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DATA ENTRY SCREEN # 4 - POLITICAL SUPPORT

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

D A TA
SOURCE

COM M FNT

NEXT SCREEN

SELECT SCREEN

QUIT

1

]

125

]
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #5 - COMPETITION

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

DATA
SOURCE

COM MENT
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN # 6 -TECHNOLOGY

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

DATA
SOURCE

COMMENT

NEXT SCREEN

SELEC T SCREEN

Q U IT

1

J

129

]

SCREEN

6 EVENTS

130

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

DATA ENTRY SCREEN #7 - PUBLIC OPINION

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

D A TA

SOURCE

COMMENT

85

86

N E X T SC R EE N

87

]

88

89

90

91

92

SELECT SCREEN

93

94

Q U IT

1

]

W
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #8 - ACADEMIC ACTIVITY

;

ISM f t e -

r-i l.a'K

*V? 5 * ■' V-rsj.**'- ^

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

D A TA
SOURCE

COMMENT

N EXT SCREEN

SELECT SCREEN

]

QUIT

]

133

]

134
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #9 - NASA SUPPORT

S’ s; «

Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

D ATA
SOURCE

COMMENT

NEXT SCREEN

SELECT SCREEN

]

QUIT

1

135

]
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN #10 - DoD SUPPORT

■
Even Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event Event

DATA
SOURCE

COMMENT

NEXT SCREEN

1

SELECT SCREEN

]

QUIT

1

co
- 'j
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DATA ENTRY SCREEN M ENU
:To m ake a selection, click on the button to the right of the d esired entry screen. If this is
y o u r first time through the survey, it is recom m ended that you pro ceed sequentially through
;all of the d a ta screens to determ ine which of the questions you wish to answer.

D a ta Entry Screen #1 - Launch Activity i
D a ta Etry Screen #2 - Launch Costs

O

D a ta Entry Screen #3 - Regulatory Environment

O

D a ta Entry S creen #4 - Political Support

O

D a ta Entry Screen #5 - Competition

O

D a ta Entry Screen #6 - Technology

O

D a ta Entry Screen #7 - Public Opinion

Q

D a ta Entry Screen #8 - A cadem ic Activity

O

D a ta Entry Screen #9 - NASA Support

O

D ata Entry Screen # 1 0 - DoD Support

O

Summary Comments Screen

O

Q U IT
SELECT

SCREEN

I

SUMMARY

COMMENTS

SCREEN

140
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Space Infrastructure Survey Instructions

Thank you for participating in this survey to support my dissertation
research. The objective of the research is to contribute to the body of
knowledge in strategic decision making in environments characterized by
primary uncertainty and non-linear dynamic relationships. You were selected as
a survey respondent because of your knowledge and/or interest in space launch
activities. It is not anticipated that you will be able to respond in all ten of the
information categories of the survey, but you are encouraged to respond in any
area that you have some knowledge. Your responses will be kept confidential.
Only aggregate data from all respondents will be presented in the final
document.
The enclosed software was custom designed for this survey, using Visual
Basic Version 3.0. It requires an IBM-compatible machine with M S-DO S Version
3.1 or later and Microsoft Windows Version 3.0 or later running in standard or
enhanced mode. Please note that with older hardware configurations having low
processing rates and minimal memory capacity, the execution time for this and
other Windows-based software products will increase drastically. If you have
any problems running the software, please contact me by phone at the number
listed below.

The MS-DOS SHARE.EXE program must also be running. If SHARE
is not executed in your AUTOEXEC.BAT file, you must exit Windows and, at
the DOS Prompt, type SHARE/L:500 then hit the Enter key, and then
restart Windows.
The enclosed floppy diskette contains a "setup” program that will load the
SURVEY1 program onto your hard drive and create an icon in the Windows
Program Manager. To run the setup program, insert the diskette, start Windows,
and use the File Manager to locate the setup.exe program on the floppy drive
you are using. Double click your mouse on setup.exe. Setup will make a
directory called S U R V E Y ! It is important that you do ro t elect to change the
directory name.
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The diskette supplied to you has been screened for all known
viruses and none have been detected.

To run the program, simply double click on the SURVEY1 icon in the
Windows Program Manager, and follow the directions. The program runs in a
manner similar to other Windows applications.
A brief tutorial is included in the program. It contains important
information which will facilitate your interaction with the software, and ensure the
validity of the data you provide. If using the software for the first time, or unsure
of how to proceed, please go through this tutorial.
Any time you quit the program, your responses will be saved to a data
base resident on the floppy diskette. You can quit and restart as many times as
you wish without losing data previously entered.
The final interactive screen in the program is a Summary Comments
screen. It is accessed from the final Data Entry screen (No. 10). Any additional
comments you have can be entered in text on this screen, and will be greatly
appreciated.
W hen you are finished with the survey, simply return the diskette by mail
in the envelope provided. If you wish to keep the software or pass it on to
colleagues, additional copies of the diskettes can be made. It is best to copy
prior to entering data. (Note that the program will not execute with the diskette
removed from the drive.)

W ayne Woodhams
Department of Engineering Management
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529

Voice: (804) 683-5478
FAX: (804) 683-5640
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Survey Respondents Solicited, by Position

•

Manager, NASA Headquarters Commercial Programs Office

•

Assistant Administrator for Commercial Programs, NASA Field Activity

•

Former NASA Launch Vehicle Development Program Manager

•

Director, Space Communications Technology Center

•

Associate Director, U.S. DoT Office of Commercial Space Transportation

•

Legislative Assistant for Space, U.S. Congress, Science, Space and Technology Committee

•

Policy Analyst, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

•

Launch Vehicle Program Manager, Large Aerospace Conglomerate

•

Senior Mechanical Engineer, Launch Vehicle Division, Mid-Sized Launch Vehicle and
Satellite Developer

•

Business Development Manager, Commercial Communications Satellite Developer

•

Systems Engineer, Commercial Space Hardware and Services Provider

•

Former General Manager of (Aerospace)Technology Transfer, State Government Agency

•

Director, State-Sponsored Spaceport Activity

•

Attorney At Law, Specializing in Space Law

•

Manager, Space Investment Group

•

Director, Academic Space Research Association

•

Director, Space Grant Consortium

•

Editor, Space Periodical

•

Director, Student Programs, Aerospace Professional Association

•

Space Policy Analyst

•

Commercial Space Insurance Underwriter
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Respondent N-4-1
Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1985
1.375
7.75
6
6.75
2.9375
1.9375
8.5625
8.4375
4.9375
0.5625

1986
1.5
8.0625
6.125
7.625
2.9375
4.5
8.4375
8.75
7.375
0.4375

1987
1.1875
8.5
6.625
8.0625
3
6
8.5625
9
8.5
0.375

1988
1.5
8.75
7.5
8.75
2.9375
7.5
8.9375
9.1875
9.0625
0.4375

1989
1.25
8.9375
8.5
9.1875
5.9375
8.3125
9.1875
9.1875
9.5
0.625

1990
1.75
9.25
9.5
9.5
7.6875
8.6875
9.1875
9.5625
10.0625
0.4375

1991
1.75
9.375
10
10
8.6875
9.9375
9.25
9.9375
9.625
0.375

1992
3.875
9.5625
9.0625
9.875
8.9375
10
10.0625
9.9375
8.5625
2.4375

1993
10
9.5
7.5
8
9.25
9.75
10
8.6875
6.5
6.5

1994
5.5625
10
5.5
4
10.0625
9.625
10
7.5625
1.5
10.0625

Data Sources
Screen 1: "None - just guesses ”

Screen Comments
Screen 1: "Low end # confined to Scout until Pegasus, upper end # was Delta & Atlas"
Screen 2: "Little change since there were limited customers • curve should match inflation"
Screen 3: "DOT is the big player, they restricted their views to launch only until COMET"
Screen 6: "DOD didn't need small vehicles until $ crunch occurred, NASA just figured it out in
’94"
Screen 7: "Visited NASA & DOD visitors centers all over the country - I've always found them
crowded!"
Screen 10: "In a declining DOD budget, COM SPACE is now a potential source of income for
DOD - strongly supported now."

"Summary Comments"
"Wayne, glad to help. These are my first guesses, backed up by experience but no data. The
launch rates are a matter of record and are carried in Jane’s and the AIAA magazine, I just don't
have the actual numbers handy. Hope my submission is a bit of help. Should you wish me to go
back and dig up data to back up my assertions and "hip shots", let me know, I may have a bit
more time in early March. It's interesting that you took such a wide payload weight, there have
been launchers to service the upper weight needs but, when we started COM ET, there were NO
launchers on the market which were targeted for the 2000# bracket - if there were, we would
have bought three!"
Good luck and let me know if I can be of any further help.
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Respondent S-1-1
Question 1985
1
2.9375
2
4.9375
3
7.125
4
4.0625
5
2.0625
6
1.0625
7
5
8
7
9
3.0625
10
1.75

1986
2.9375
4.8125
6.8125
3.875
2.0625
1.125
8.25
6.9375
3.625
1.625

1987
2.8125
4.75
6.25
3.875
2.125
1.125
5.5625
7.0625
4.0625
2.3125

1988
3.5625
4.9375
5.875
3.625
1.9375
1.25
5.375
6.875
3.75
3

1989
4.25
5.3125
6.125
3.125
2.4375
6.4375
4.875
6.125
3.1875
3.75

1990
4.4375
5.5625
6.4375
2.4375
2.6875
4.0625
4.375
5.1875
2.5625
3.625

1991
4.1875
5.8125
6.9375
1.8125
3.125
3.4375
4.25
4.6875
2.1875
3.6875

1992
4.1875
5.75
5.875
1.125
3.4375
6.1875
2.6875
4.4375
1.6875
4.0625

1993
4
6.25
4

1
3.3125
7.3125
2.4375
3.6875
1.25
4.25

1994
3.875
6.6875
2.5
1.0625
3.3125
8.1875
2.625
3.5
0.9375
4.875

Screen 6 Events
1989: "Introduction of Pegasus”

Screen Comments
Screen 3: T h e changes of administration and space policy has affected Commercial Space.
As Congress has grappled with remote sensing and launch vehicle issues, the support for
Commercial Space has changed."
Screen 8: "Falloff of research due to SDI reduction and military reduction levels ”
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Respondent N-4-2
Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1985
-0.0625
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
8
0

1986
-0.0625
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0

1987
•0.0625
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8.0625
0

1988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7.9375
0

1989
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8.0625
0

1990
0.125
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0

1991____ 1392____1393____1934
0
0.0625 0.125
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
2.8125 2.8125
0
0
0

Screen 4 Events
1986: "Established CCDS program"
1993: "CCDS Program Cut"
1994: "CCDS Program severely cut"

Screen 9 Events
1985: "Supported CCDS effort"
1986: "Supported CCDS effort”
1987: "Supported CCDS effort"
1988: "Supported CCDS effort"
1989: " Supported CCDS effort"
1990: "Reorganization placed CCDS program in jeopardy"
1991: "NASA's continued reorganization jeopardized CCDS program"
1992: "NASA's continued reorganization jeopardized CCDS program"
1993: "Cutbacks, reduced funding of CCDS program, number CCDSs reduced"
1994: "NASA reorganization, cutbacks, CCDS program in jeopardy"

Screen 10 Events
1993: "TRP - good for commercial space (ARPA)"
1994: "TRP - good for commercial space (ARPA)"
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Respondent N-4-2 (Cont'cH
Screen Comments
Screen 10: "Good until Challenger. Bad after Challenger accident. Bad n o w ."
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Respondent L-1-1
Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1985
17b
0
1.75
3.6875
4.9375
1.9375
4.9375
0
1.875
0.375

1986
2.1875
0
1.625
3.5
4.9375
1.75
5.9375
0
1.9375
0.4375

1987 _ 1988
0.8125 1.1875
0
0
1.5625 2.3125
3.4375 5.3125
4.875
4.8125
1.8125 1.8125
4.8125 3.9375
0
0
1.8125 2.375
0.375
0.6875

1989
1.25
0
2.125
3.3125
6
2
2.875
0
2.375
1.125

1990
0.6875
0
2.6875
3.3125
6
1.8125
2.5
0
1.8125
1.3125

1991
1.3125
0
2.6875
3.125
5.9375
1.875
2.5
0
1.875
1.75

1992
0.6875
0
3.1875
3.125
5.9375
1.875
2.5
0
1.8125
1.875

1993
0.8125
0
3.3125
3.125
6
1.8125
2.4375
0
1.8125
2.4375

1994
0.5
0
3
3.9375
5.9375
1.875
2.4375
0
1.75
3

Summary Comments
"(Contact), DOT/OCST, (202) 366-2980"
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Respondent G-1-1
Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1985
0
0
0
0
0
0
6.75
0
2
1

1986
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.8125
0
1.8125
1

1987
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.5
0
2.875
0.875

1988
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.1875
0
1.875
1.875

1989
2.75
0
7.9375
0
0
4.9375
3.1875
0
1.8125
1.9375

1990
6.625
0
5.4375
3.5625
4.625
4.9375
3.125
0
0.875
1.375

1991
6.8125
0
7.875
3
6.1875
4.9375
3.0625
0
0.875
1.25

1992
5.5625
0
7.9375
2.875
4.9375
5.8125
2.875
0
1.875
1.25

1993
4.1875
0
7.875
4.3125
7.9375
6.9375
2.8125
0
3.875
2.875

1994
4.125
0
7.8125
4.3125
8.9375
7.875
2.5625
0
5
6.375

Data Sources:
Screen 1: "Office records on commercial licensed launches”
Screen 2: "anecdotal"
Screen 3: "personal observation"
Screen 4: "personal observation"
Screen 5: "market studies, observation"
Screen 9: "personal observation, NASA statements"

Comments Screens
Screen 1: "only dealing with commercial licensed launches since first in 1989"
Screen 2: "incremental improvements in existing vehicles has brought some savings"
Screen 3: ”1990 drop represents NASA taking their launches out of com mercial"
Screen 4: "support has been mostly verbal, little action"
Screen 5: "new countries, new vehicles entering m arket"
Screen 8: "I don't really have much id e a "
Screen 9: "marked change under Dan Goldin and budget pressure"
Screen 10: "they seem to have realized that post-cold war, commercial is wave of future"
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Respondent C-2-1

Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1985
7
2.3125
2
2.0625
0.9375
1.0625
6.0625
5.9375
4
1.875

1986
1.9375
2.125
1.9375
2
0.875
1.0625
5.5
1.1875
0.9375
1.8125

1987
1.8125
1.8125
5.4375
2.5625
1.4375
0.9375
3
1.1875
1
3

1988
2.4375
1.375
6.4375
2.625
2.1875
3
2.625
1.1875
0.9375
3.3125

1989
2.9375
1.1875
6.25
2.625
3.0625
3.9375
2.25
1.5
0.9375
3.5625

1990
4.375
1.3125
6.3125
2.75
5.125
4.5625
1.8125
1.875
1.0625
3.6875

1991
4.6875
1.125
6.1875
2.9375
7
4.875
1.6875
2.1875
1.1875
4.0625

1992
5.4375
1.1875
6.875
4.25
5.9375
5.25
1.6875
2.5625
1.3125
4.1875

1993
6.0625
1.5625
7.625
4.5
5.5625
5.5
1.5625
2.875
1.375
4.4375

1994
6.125
1.75
8.4375
5.0625
5.0625
5.875
1.6875
3.4375
1.375
4.5625

Data Source Comments:
Screen 3:
"With the advent of the WARC and FCC "opening” of the radio spectrum, and the loosening of
the DoD restrictions on use of hi-res imagery, the regulatory environment is vastly improved.”

Screen Comments
Screen 1:
"A lot of "small spacecraft" were effectively carried into orbit via the shuttle, prior to
Challenger. The attached payloads program has been a low-level-of-effort, but successful NASA
program ~ one of the very few bright spots in the NASA commercial mix."
Screen 2:
"This varies significantly for secondary vs. dedicated launch costs. Secondary costs are
very low; dedicated launcher costs have stabilized at or around $10-15 million per launch, less
with Russian rockets. Big problem today is cost of launch insurance - a significant portion of the
total mission cost!"
Screen 3:
"With the advent of the WARC and FCC rules for Big and Little LEOs, and the lifting of
restrictions on hi-res imagery, regulatory issues support commercial space are extremely
favorable today."

Screen 4:
" Federal policy moved from "benign neglect" in the early 80s, to one of strong support.
Support came mostly from DARPA and FCC, not NASA. In general, NASA remains hostile to
commercial space, and small space in particular. Note how many missions, like Clementine, Big
and Little LEOs are completely devoid of NASA support. To NASA, commercial space remains
materials processing and spin-offs, and maybe ACTS, too. Note how NASA screwed up the
COM ET program."
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Respondent C-2-1 (Cont’d.)
Screen 5:
" First, there was only shuttle and Ariane. Then came a bunch of "non-real" companies,
like E-Prime. Then OSC with Pegasus and Taurus, followed by International Microspace, Ariane
ASAP ring, and growth in large commercial rockets, entry of China. With fall of Soviet Union,
Russian rockets became available, and big companies entered the fray, such as Lockheed, with
LLV and the LKE. Then, a few drop-outs, like CTA (bought, then discarded International
Microspace), Conatech, EER, and others. There are now only a few small satellite launch
services providers, but the credibility of the remaining players is pretty good."
Screen 6:
"Many new and innovative technologies have been developed in support of small space.
The Pegasus design used many new approaches, including synthetic wing and highly automated
booster manufacture. Many advances have also found there way into the spacecraft, such as
Orbcomm small batteries, STARSYS advanced CDMA communications filter, and others,
enabling smaller and small payloads to be very, very capable."
Screen 7:
"Following the Challenger disaster, the public's support of "space" has become almost
non-existent. However, despite this era of budget-cutting worldwide, allowed by public apathy in
govt space programs, industry has re-awakened to see many possibilities in communications
and hi-resolution remote sensing."

Screen 8:
"Academic space research of a commercial nature, is making a slow but steady recovery
from the Challenger disaster. It takes years for academic projects to be decided upon and
funded. Also, since business in pursuing commercial space activity more vigorously than gov't,
that is "where the action is," and business-university relationships for R&D are precarious, at
best, and often aren't fruitful for the company."

Screen 9:
"NASA's disdain for the commercial space community can be best seen in the
abolishment of "Code C," the office of commercial programs, and in NASA's constant turf wars
with other Federal commercial space operations (DoT, DoC, and others). NASA has completely
bungled the relationship with industry vis-a-vis the Space Station. The only truly viable NASA
commercial programs going on today are ACTS and some remote sensing work, although the
latter is benefiting primarily from the declassification of DoD missions. Also, NASA is testing out
some commercial use of TDRSS. NASA, by and large, thinks that "spin-offs" are commercial
space, and the agency is more interested in protecting and administering its operational
programs, rather than in fostering the development of a strong industry."
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Respondent C-2-1 (Cont’d.)
Screen 10:
” DoD has learned that the commercial industry can be a true friend and a reliable
supplier of high-tech solutions to DoD needs. After the Challenger disaster, DoD was effectively
"forced" to rely upon the industry for ELVs, a policy which has been very successful. Also,
almost in an accidental partnership, a DoD mission - GPS - has spawned a multi-billion dollar
positioning industry. (Also, remember when the Internet was 'ARPANET?') DoD is interested in
using space to complete its mission, which is military. Therefore, they view space as a "tool" not
a "territory." Contrast this with NASA whose mission is space - and therefor, its "turf" is space!
Thus, NASA has a "not-invented-here" syndrome, while DoD has a "hey-that’s-great-can-l-buysome-to-complete-my-mission" mentality."

Events: Screen 1
1985: "Space Shuttles carry many attached small payloads into orbit."
1986: "Challenger disaster effectively cripples commercial space industry."
1987: " Resurgence of interest in small payloads, small launch vehicles."
1988: "Spaceport Florida created; OSC announces Pegasus project."
1989: "Spaceport concept spreads to other states (HI, VA, AK); Little LEOs started.”
1990: "DARPA buys its first Pegasus; small satellite programs funded by gov't.”
1991: "First Pegasus launched; Orbcomm-X launched (failed); Iridium announced."
1992: "Further Big LEO announcements; LLV bom; Taurus unveiled; WARC-92."
1993: "Teledesic announced; market becomes clearer for LEO services."
1994: "Orbcomm licensed; second round of Little LEOs nets five applicants.”

Events: Screen 3
1985: "Commercial space largely still a "dream," except for GEO communication satellites. ”
1986: "Challenger disaster effectively freezes all policy making.”
1987: ""No commercial use of shuttle" reinvigorates ELV industry; industry still reeling,
however."
1988: "Industry doing "due diligence.""
1989: "Orbcomm, Pegasus, and other initiatives "heat up" the industry."
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Respondent C-2-1 f Cont’d.)

1990: "Strong support of small satellites by DARPA.”
1991: "Big LEOs, backed by Big Companies, spur interest."
1992: "WARC-92 clears the way for Big and Little LEOs."
1993: "More and more people entering the fray."
1994: "Little LEOs licensed."
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Respondent 1-1-1
Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1985
9.9375
0
6.8125
8
5.125
6.875
9.875
0
9.9375
9.9375

1986
3.0625
0
8
7.875
4.9375
7.375
9.875
0
9.0625
10

1987
2.5
0
7.875
8.3125
5.9375
7.9375
8.9375
0
5.5
9.875

1988
7
0
7.9375
8.875
6.875
8.9375
7.75
0
5.5
9.8125

1989
4.5625
0
7.9375
9.5
7.5
7.875
6.875
0
6
9.9375

1990
10.0625
0
8.4375
9.9375
7.4375
8.5
0.3125
0
6.375
9.9375

1991
8.062S
0
9.3125
9.9375
8.0625
8.5
6.125
0
6.5
9.9375

1992
9.5
0
10
9.875
8.9375
8.9375
5.6875
0
6.5
9.875

1993
6
0
9.3125
9.3125
9.5
10
5.625
0
6.75
10

1994
10
0
9.0625
8.375
10.0625
10.0625
5.5625
0
6.875
9.875

Data Sources:
Screen 1: "COMMERCIAL GEOSYNCHRONOUS C O M M UNICATIO NS SATELLITES"

Screen Comments:
Screen 1: "WE D O N T HAVE DATA FOR THE C A TEGORIES YO U REQUESTED"
Screen 2: "NOT AVAILABLE IN OUR DATA BASE. CO N TAC T D EPT OF TRANSP, OFFICE
OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION 202-366-5770"
Screen 7: "CHALLENGER ACCIDENT IN 1986 HAD SIG N IFIC A N T IMPACT"
Screen 8: "HAVE NO ID E A "
Screen 9: "AFTER CHALLENGER ACCIDENT, PO LICY TO R ESTR IC T COM MERCIAL
PAYLOADS ON SHUTTLE HAD MAJOR IMPACT"
Screen 10: "DOD SU PPO R T SEEM S TO BE R ESTRICTED T O SUPPORTING A LAUNCH
AND SATELLITE INDUSTRY THROUGH THEIR MILITARY CONTRACTS AND SU PPO R T OF
TH E LAUNCH INFRASTRUCTURE. PROCUREM ENT O F UFO SATELLITE BY NAVY A
MAJOR CHANGE IN APPROACH. NASA’S RECENT AW A R D O F TDRS C O NTRACT AS A
DELIVERY-ON-ORBIT ALSO SUPPORTIVE OF COM M ERCIAL SPACE."

Summary Comments
"RESPONSES PROVIDED ON THE BASIS OF NO T BEING ATTRIBUTED TO XXXXXXX OR
TO XXXXXX. MUCH O F TH IS SURVEY DEALS IN PER C EPTIO N S RATHER THAN
QUANTITATIVE DATA."
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Respondent A-3-1
Question
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
g
10

1985
0
8
0.6875
0.875
3.625
4.1875
9.8125
9.625
0.6875
1.9375

1986
1
7.8125
1.0625
2.25
3.625
3.9375
8.3125
8.5
0.5625
1.9375

1987
1.25
7.3125
2
2.25
4.875
5.5
7.5
7.6875
0.5625
2.5625

1988
2
7
2.0625
2.3125
4.8125
5.5
6.5
8.5
1.0625
2.5

1989
2
6.5
3.5625
7
5.9375
7.875
6.0625
8.4375
1.25
3

1990
3.0625
6.375
3.8125
7
8.5
7.8125
5.5625
8.625
1.5625
4

1991
5.375
6.1875
5.625
7
8.5625
7.9375
4.8125
8.375
1.5
4.0625

1992
7.5
6.3125
5.875
8.0625
8.5
10
4.75
7.5625
1.9375
4.0625

1993
8.3125
6.3125
5.9375
8.0625
10.0625
10
4.75
7.5625
2.0625
4.5

1994
8.5625
6.125
6.9375
8
10
10
4.0625
6.5625
2
4.5625

Summary Comments
"My responses are not data based but are based on perspectives and impressions from working
in the aerospace arena since 1979. I am more familiar with NASA programs than those of DOD
and I am sure that this is reflected in my responses."
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Data Filtering Rationale by Decision Factor
Factor No. 1: Launch Activity
'85 - ‘86: There is disagreement in the data. Two respondents indicated a precipitous
decrease while the others indicated a small increase. Ancillary data supports the
decrease due to the Challenger accident in 1986. Prior to Challenger, the space shuttle
earned many small to mid-sized payloads to orbit. The other data were unsubstantiated.
‘86 - ‘87: There was a consensus on a modest decline. No outliers.
‘87 - '88: There was consensus on a modest increase, with one outlier suggesting a
large increase. Comments made by the outlier indicated that the response was based
solely on geosynchronous communications satellites. The level of increase would be
inaccurate since this type represents only a small portion of the total launch activity. The
response was discarded.
‘88 - '89: There was no consensus. One substantial increase was indicated, as well as a
substantial decrease. The decrease was from the same outlier as noted for ‘87 - ‘88. The
increase was based on commercial launch activity only, and probably overstated. Since they
nearly offset, both were retained.
‘89 - ‘90: There was a consensus on a substantial increase. Comments indicate that small
satellite launches started being funded by the government. One outlier may overstate the
increase somewhat, but no evidence existed for its deletion.
‘90 - ‘91: There was no consensus. One substantial increase was indicated, as well as a
substantial decrease. Both were retained.
‘91 - ‘92: There was no consensus, and no outliers. No evidence for deletion of any responses.
'92 - '93: There was no consensus. There was one large positive outlier, and one fairly large
negative. No evidence was given to refute either, so both were retained.
'93 - '94: There was no consensus. There was one positive and one negative outlier. The
positive one was based on only part of the market. The negative one had no supporting data.
Both were retained.

Factor No. 2: Launch Costs
'85 - '86: Consensus on slight decline. No outliers.
'86 - '87: Consensus on slight decline. No outliers.
'8 7 -'8 8 : No consensus. No outliers.
‘88 - ‘89: No consensus. No outliers.
‘89 - ‘90: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
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Factor No. 2: Launch Costs fCont'd.1

‘90 - '91: No consensus. No outliers.
‘91 - ‘92: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
'92 • '93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - ‘94: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.

Factor No. 3: Leoal/Reaulatorv Environment
'85 - ‘86: No consensus. No outliers.
‘86 - ‘87: No consensus. One positive outlier, substantiated by ancillary data which identified the
unfreezing of policy making which was curtailed following Challenger. The response was
retained.
‘87 • ‘88: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
'88 • ‘89: No consensus. One highly positive outlier, with the comment that data is based on
personal observation. The data indicate that this was the first year for which the respondent had
information or knowledge, and all prior years were entered as zero. The response was
discarded, since it did not represent a change in the factor.
‘89 - '90: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
‘90 - '91: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘92 - '93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - '94: No consensus. No outliers.

Factor No. 4: Support of Federal Administration
'85 - '86: No consensus. No outliers.
'86 • ‘87: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
‘87 - ‘88: Consensus on slight increase. No outliers.
'88 - ‘89: No consensus. One positive outlier, with no evidence to confirm or deny. Response is
retained.
'89 - ‘90: Consensus on increase, with one positive outlier. The data indicate that this was the
first year for which the respondent had information or knowledge, and all prior years were
entered as zero. The response was discarded, since it did not represent a change in the factor.
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Factor No. 4: Support of Federal Administration fCont’d.1

'90 • '91: No consensus. No outliers.
‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
'92 - ‘93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - ‘94: No consensus. One negative outlier, with no evidence to confirm or deny. Response
is retained.

Factor No. 5: Competition
‘85 - '86: Consensus on slight decrease. No outliers.
‘86 - '87: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'87 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
‘88 - ‘89: Consensus on substantial increase. No outliers.
‘89 - ‘90: Consensus on substantial increase, with one positive outlier. The data indicate that
this was the first year for which the respondent had information or knowledge, and all prior years
were entered as zero. The response was discarded, since it did not represent a change in the
factor.
‘90 - '91: Consensus on substantial increase. No outliers.
'91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘92 - ‘93: No consensus, one positive outlier. Associated comment indicated that data were a
result of market studies. Response retained.
‘93 - ‘94: No consensus. No outliers.

Factor No. 6: New Technology Introduction
‘85 - '86: No consensus. No outliers.
'8 6 - ‘87: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘87 - ‘88: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'88 - ‘89: Consensus on substantial increase, with two positive outliers. Ancillary information for
one designated introduction of Pegasus launch vehicle as a leap in technology. It was retained.
For the other, the data indicate that this was the first year for which the respondent had
information or knowledge, and all prior years were entered as zero. The response was
discarded, since it did not represent a change in the factor.
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Factor No. 6: New Technology Introduction (Cont’d.)

‘89 • *90: No consensus. One negative outlier, with no evidence to confirm or deny. Response
is retained.
*90 - '91: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'91 - *92: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘92 - '93: No consensus. No outliers.
'93 - '94: Consensus on increase. No outliers.

Factor No. 7: Public Support
‘85 - '86: No Consensus. One positive and one negative outlier, neither with confirming or
denying data. Both responses retained.
‘86 - '87: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'87 - ‘88: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
‘88 - ‘89: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'89 - ‘90: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
' 9 0 - ‘91: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'91 - ‘92: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
‘92 - ‘93: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.
'93 - '94: No consensus. No outliers.

Factor No. 8: Academic Research
‘85 - ‘86: Consensus on decrease, with one negative outlier. Comment stated that research
suffered drastically as a result of Challenger. Response retained.
‘86 - ‘87: No consensus. No outliers.
•87 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
•88 - '89: No consensus. No outliers.
‘89 - '90: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
‘9 0 -'9 1 : No consensus. No outliers.
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Factor No. 8: Academic Research (Cont’d.l

‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘9 2 - ‘93: No consensus. No outliers.
‘93 - ‘94: Consensus on decrease. No outliers.

Factor No. 9: NASA Support
‘85 • ‘86: No consensus. One negative outlier, supportedby comment that NASA has always
disdained the commercial space industry. One positive outlier, with noconfirming of denying
data. Both responses retained.
'86 - ‘87: No consensus. One negative outlier, supported by comment that Challenger had a
deleterious effect.
‘87 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
‘88 - '89: No consensus. No outliers.
'89 - '90: No consensus. No outliers.
‘90 - ‘91: No consensus. One negative outlier supported by identification of NASA’s
reorganization and cutbacks in funding for C CDS’s.
‘91 - ‘92: No consensus. No outliers.
‘92 - ‘93: No consensus. No outliers.
'93 - '94: No consensus. One negative outlier, with no confirming or denying data. Response is
retained.

Factor No. 10: DoD Support
‘8 5 - ‘86: No consensus. No outliers.
‘86 - ‘87: No consensus. No outliers.
‘8 7 - ‘88: No consensus. No outliers.
'88 - '89: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
'89 - '90: No consensus. No outliers.
'90 - '91: No consensus. No outliers.
'91 - ‘92: Consensus on increase. No outliers.
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Factor No. 10: DoD Support fCont'd.)

'92 - ‘93: Consensus on increase. One positive outlier supported by comment that declining
DoD budgets have caused strong support of commercial space as a source of revenue.
‘93 - ‘94: Consensus on increase, with two positive outliers. One cites the same rationale as for
'92 • ‘93. The other is supported by comment that post-cold war climate has altered DoD's
viewpoint. Both responses retained.
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APPENDIX F

PHASE PLANE DIAGRAMS
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Phase Plane: Launch Cost vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Legal/Reg. Environ, vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Fed. Admin. Support vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Competition vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: New Technology vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered D ata)
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Phase Plane: Public Support vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Academic Research vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Launch Activity

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Launch Activity
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Phase Plane: Legal/Reg. Environ, vs. Launch Cost

(Filtered D ata)
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Phase Plane: Fed. Admin. Support vs. Launch Cost

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Competition vs. Launch Cost

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: New Technology vs. Launch Cost

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Public Support vs. Launch Cost

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Academic Research vs. Launch Cost

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Launch Cost
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Launch Cost

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane:
Fed. Admin. Support vs. Legal/Reg. Environ.

(Filtered D ata)
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Phase Plane: Competition vs. Legal/Reg. Environ.

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane:
New Technology vs. Legal/Reg. Environ.

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Public Support vs. Legal/Reg. Environ.
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Phase Plane:
Academic Research vs. Legal/Reg. Environ.

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Legal/Reg. Environ.
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Legal/Reg. Environ.
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Phase Plane: Competition vs. Fed. Admin. Support (Filtered

Data)
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Phase Plane:
New Technology vs. Fed. Admin. Support
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Phase Plane: Public Support vs. Fed. Admin. Support
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Phase Plane:
Academic Research vs. Fed. Admin. Support (Filtered

D ata)
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Fed. Admin. Support

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Fed. Admin. Support

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: New Technology vs. Competition

(Filtered Data)
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Phase Plane: Public Support vs. Competition
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Competition
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Competition
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Phase Plane:
Academic Research vs. New Technology
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Phase Plane: NASA Support v s . New Technology
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. New Technology
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Phase Plane: Academic Research vs. Public Support
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. Public Support
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Phase Plane: NASA Support vs. Academic Research
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs.Academic Research
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Phase Plane: DoD Support vs. NASA Support (Filtered Data)
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Analysis o F P tase Planes
Factor Pair

Periodicity
Prior Four Last Four

Trajectory by Quadrant

Rsrchr. Res

Projected Behavior
Resi
Res
Resip 4

P1

P2

P3

1

Launch Cost

V S.

Launch Activity

3

3

4

4

1

1

1

1

2

8

2

2

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

VS.

Launch Activity

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

4

3

2

6

3

Fed. Admin. Support

vs.

Launch Activity

2

2

1

1

1

4

1

4

3

2

8

4

Competition

vs.

Launch Activity

2

2

1

1

1

1

4

1

2

2

8

5

New Technology

vs.

Launch Activity

2

2

1

1

4

1

1

1

2

8

2

6

Public Support

vs.

Launch Activity

3

3

4

4

4

4

4

4

3

2

2

7

Academic Research

vs.

Launch Activity

3

3

1

4

1

4

4

4

3

8

2

8

vs.

Launch Activity

3

3

1

1

4

4

4

4

3

8

2

9

NASA Support
DoO Support

OUT 1 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 1 OUT 1
OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 4 OUT 1
OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 IN 4 OUT 4
OUT 4 OUT 3 OUT 3 IN 4 OUT 4

vs.

Launch Activity

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

OUT 2 OUT 2

10

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

vs.

Launch Cost

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

4

4

2

2

11

Fed. Admin. Support

vs.

Launch Cost

2

2

2

2

1

4

1

4

4

2

8

12
13

Competition

vs.

Launch Cost

3

2

2

2

1

1

4

1

1

2

8

New Technology

vs.

Launch Cost

2

2

2

2

4

1

1

1

1

14

Public Support

vs.

Launch Cost

3

3

3

3

15

Academic Research

vs.

Launch Cost

3

3

2

3

16

NASA Support

vs.

Launch Cost

3

3

2

2

1

4

4

4

4

2

1

2

1

OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 2 a m  1 OUT 1
IN 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 our 4 OUT 4
OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 4 OUT 4
IN
4 OUT 1 OUT 3 IN
1 IN 3

IN

1

IN

1

IN

2

IN

1

IN

1

IN

1

IN

4

IN

1

OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 IN 4 IN
1
OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 4 OUT 1 OUT 1
OUT 1 IN 4 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1
OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 1 IN 4 OUT 4

8

1

8

1

OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 IN 4 OUT 4
OUT 1

17

DoD Support

vs.

Launch Cost

3

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

18

Fed. Admin. Support

vs.

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

1

1

1

1

1

4

1

3

3

1

IN

1 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1
3 OUT 3 IN 3 IN 2
IN 3 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2
OUT 1 OUT 2 IN 2 OUT 1 IN 2

19

Competition

vs.

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

4

1

1

1

1

1

4

2

2

1

8
8

20

New Technology

vs.

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

1

1

1

1

4

1

1

2

2

2

2

21

Public Support

vs.

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

3

3

1

2

IN

3 OUT 3

IN

3

22
23

Academic Research
NASA Support

vs.
vs.

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

3
3

3
3

2

2

OUT 4

IN

2

IN

4

Legal/Regulatory Environ.

4
4

2

2

OUT 4

IN

2

IN

4

IN
IN

4
3

24

DoO Support

vs.

Lfgal/Reguiatory Environ.

IN

25

Competition

vs.

Fed. Admin. Support

IN

26

New Technology

vs.

Fed. Admin. Support

27

Public Support

vs.

Fed. Admin. Support

28

Academic Research

vs.

Fed. Admin. Support

29

NASA Support

vs.

30

DoD Support

vs.

31

New Technology

32

Public Support

4
4

1
1

4

1

4

1

1

1

IN

4

IN

3 OUT 3

4

1

4

1

4

4

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

2

4

2

2

1

2

OUT 2
OUT 3

1

1

4

2

1

2

2

2

3

4

3

3

1

3

4
4

IN

IN
IN

4

2 OUT 1

IN

3 OUT 2

IN

2 IN 2
3 OUT 2

2

OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2

IN

2 OUT 2

2

OUT 3

IN

3

2

2

OUT 3 OUT 3

IN

3 OUT 3

OUT 3

4

1

4

1

3

4

3

Fed. Admin. Support

4

4

1

1

4

3

4

3

3

2

2

Fed. Admin. Support

4

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

2

vs.

Competition

2

1

1

1

4

1

2

1

1

2

2

vs.

Competition

3

4

4

4

4

4

3

4

4

1

2

3 OUT 3
IN

3
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IN 3 IN 3 IN 3
IN
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33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Academic Research

vs.

Competition

NASA Support
DoDSupport

Competition
Competition
New Technology

Academic Research

vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.

NASA Support
DoD Support

vs.
vs.

New Technology
New Technology

Academic Research

vs.

Public Support

NASA Support
DoD Support

vs.

Public Support

vs.

Public Support

NASA Support

vs.

Academic Research

DoD Support

vs.

Academic Research

DoO Support

vs.

NASA Support

Public Support

Periodicity
Prior Four Last Four

Trajectoiy by Quadrant

Factor Pair

New Technology

3
3
3
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
1
4
4
4
1

Projected Behavior
Rsrchr. Res P 1 Res p 2 Res
P3 Res P4

3 4 4
3 4 4
2 1 1
4 4 4
4 4 4
4 4 4
1 1 1
3 3 3
3 3 3
2 2 2
3 3 3

2
2
1
2
8

2
2
2
1

1

IN
OUT
IN
OUT

6

1
1

OUT
OUT

2

1
1

OUT

3
2
3

4 1 4
1 4 4
i 1 1 1
4 4 3 4
1 4 2 4
1 1 3 4
1 1 2 1
2 3 1 3
2 2 3 3
2 2 2 2
1 2 4 3

1

1

4

1

2

1

2

1

2

2

2

2

2

1

2

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

3

1

1

2
8

OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4

3
1
4
4
4
1
3
3

OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1
OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
OUT 1 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4 OUT 4
OUT 1 OUT 1 OUT 1 IN 1
OUT 2 OUT 3

IN

3
3
OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2
OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3 OUT 3

IN

OUT 3 OUT 2

IN

IN

OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2
OUT 2 OUT 2 OUT 2 IN 2

IN

2

IN

2

OUT

IN
IN

3
3
2
3

214

APPENDIX H

SYSTEM UNCERTAINTY INDEX CHARTS FOR INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
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Launch Cost/Launch Activity Phase Plane With “Next Point" Projections
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Public Support/DoD Support Phase Plane With “Next Point” Projections
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